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THE MAKING OF THE SECOND REHNQUIST COURT: 
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
THOMAS W. MERRILL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court is implicitly assumed to have a certain unity of 
character under each Chief Justice.  Hence, we refer to the “Marshall Court,” 
the “Warren Court,” and the “Rehnquist Court.”  A closer look at history 
reveals that this assumption of a natural Court defined by the tenure of each 
Chief Justice is often misleading.  The Marshall Court had a different character 
late in its life than it did in its early years.1  Similarly, the Warren Court 
became distinctively more liberal and activist after 1962 when Felix 
Frankfurter retired and was replaced by Arthur Goldberg.2 
Although the Rehnquist Court is still with us, we can already perceive that 
there have been two Rehnquist Courts.  The first Rehnquist Court lasted from 
October 1986 to July 1994.  It featured frequent membership changes, a 
relatively full (but declining) calendar of argued cases, and majority coalitions 
that shifted from issue to issue.  The questions that commanded the most 
 
 * John Paul Stevens Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.  Helpful leads, 
suggestions, and corrections were provided by Ron Allen, Bob Bennett, Rick Brooks, Steve 
Calabresi, David Dana, Shari Diamond, Tracey George, Joel Goldstein, Heidi Kitrosser, Bill 
Marshall, Eric Muller, Emerson Tiller, and Albert Yoon.  I have also benefited from workshop 
discussions at North Carolina and Penn Law Schools.  Gene DeAngelis provided valuable 
research assistance. 
  I am especially grateful for the many fine and thoughtful commentaries on the lecture 
published in this issue.  Although each of the commentators offers important insights and 
qualifications that ideally would result in modifications to the lecture, I have not made such 
changes in order to avoid creating a “moving target” problem for the commentators.  Thus, my 
failure to acknowledge or respond to the commentators’ criticisms should not be taken to imply 
either that I agree or disagree with them, and it most certainly does not mean that I regard them as 
without force.  
 1. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 127-28 (1985) (noting that after a period of “remarkable 
unanimity,” differences of opinion began to emerge on the Marshall Court after 1827 as 
Marshall’s earlier colleagues were supplanted by new appointees). 
 2. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND 
CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 415 (1990) (denominating the period after Frankfurter’s retirement “The 
Real Warren Court”). 
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attention were social issues, such as abortion (and in particular whether Roe v. 
Wade3 would be overruled), other privacy issues like the right to die, 
affirmative action, and government speech on religious topics (such as school 
prayer and crèches in city hall).  Yet, notwithstanding its attention to these 
issues, the Court produced relatively few important doctrinal innovations in 
these areas, and high-profile cases often ended up with no opinion 
commanding the support of five Justices. 
The second Rehnquist Court started in October 1994 and is still with us.  
This Court has had no change in its membership, has decided just half the 
number of cases the Court did in 1986, and is increasingly dominated by a 
single bloc of five Justices.  Social issues like abortion, affirmative action, and 
school prayer have significantly receded from the scene.  Instead, the dominant 
theme of the second Rehnquist Court has been constitutional federalism, 
including the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause and Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth Amendment limitations on federal 
power, and state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits reflected in the 
Eleventh Amendment.  The Court has generated a number of important 
innovations in the interpretation of these provisions, nearly always in decisions 
in which the controlling opinion garners exactly five votes.  These innovations, 
together with other controversial 5-4 decisions like Bush v. Gore4 and Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale,5 have evoked heated accusations that we have 
entered a new era of “judicial sovereignty.”6 
I am not the first to observe that the Rehnquist Court took a distinctive turn 
in the mid-1990s, nor to seek an explanation for this change.  Indeed, three 
notable attempts to explain the Rehnquist Court’s behavior have recently been 
advanced by legal scholars.  John McGinnis, in a sympathetic account, has 
argued the Rehnquist Court’s recent decisions reflect a pervasive concern with 
fostering localism and associational autonomy.7  Chris Schroeder, in a less 
sympathetic vein, has suggested the Court’s new jurisprudence reflects a 
general decline in trust in the federal government dating from the War in 
Vietnam and Watergate.8  Jed Rubenfeld, in the least sympathetic effort to find 
 
 3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 5. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 6. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 14 (2001).  Kramer is hardly alone in accusing the Rehnquist Court of turning to a new 
form of activism after the mid-1990s.  See, e.g., Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 481 (2002); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 
(2001). 
 7. See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
 8. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307 (2001). 
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a unifying theme, thinks the new concern with constitutional federalism is a 
cover for the majority’s hostility to extensions of antidiscrimination law 
beyond traditional concerns about invidious race and gender discrimination.9 
I will forego any such ideational approach to understanding the second 
Rehnquist Court, largely because I am not persuaded that the Court’s recent 
behavior can be neatly subsumed under any single conceptual rubric.  
McGinnis’s devolutionary theory, for example, cannot account for the 
continued willingness of the Court to find state laws preempted by federal 
regulation, to strike down discriminatory state laws under the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine, and to eliminate state experimentation with 
different sorts of electoral regimes under an ever-expanding First 
Amendment.10  Schroeder’s account suffers from the same failings, and it 
cannot explain why the decline in trust in the federal government began to 
affect the Court only in the mid-1990s, nor why it has affected only five of the 
nine Justices.  Likewise, Rubenfeld’s hypothesis of hostility toward newer 
antidiscrimination laws cannot explain why the Court has also invoked 
constitutional federalism to invalidate federal environmental laws, gun control 
laws, protections for intellectual property rights, causes of action against false 
advertising, and regulations that protect cruise ships that offer casino 
gambling.11 
Instead of explaining the emergence of the second Rehnquist Court in 
terms of some unifying Weltanschauung, I will search for answers using the 
harsh realism of political science.  In particular, I will borrow from recent 
writings of political scientists who specialize in the study the Supreme Court.  
My objective is not to pass myself off as a political scientist.  I am not—I am a 
law professor.  However, I believe that law professors have a good deal to 
learn by paying more attention to what political scientists have been writing 
about courts.  Moreover, I suspect that political scientists have something to 
 
 9. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002). 
 10. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding state products 
liability action impliedly preempted by policy of federal regulatory agency); Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding state law prohibiting state from purchasing 
goods and services from Burma invalid under dormant Commerce Clause); Cal. Democratic Party 
v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (holding that California’s experiment with blanket primary election 
system violates the First Amendment); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 
182 (1999) (holding state restrictions on ballot initiatives violate First Amendment). 
 11. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (ability of federal 
agency to hear complaint about discrimination against cruise ships that offer casino gambling); 
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 
(2001) (authority of EPA to regulate isolated waters); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (federal regulation of false advertising); 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (federal 
protection of patent rights); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (federal gun control 
law). 
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learn by paying attention to what law professors perceive to be happening on 
the Court.  One of my goals in this lecture is to play the role of the go-between 
between these two groups of scholars, who tend to operate in isolation from 
each other.  In drawing upon models from political science, I hope to 
encourage lawyers to make greater use of those models in their own work.  
Likewise, in discussing some recent developments on the Rehnquist Court, 
which may be more familiar to lawyers, I hope to stimulate political scientists 
to take a closer look at the changing behavior of the Rehnquist Court, using 
their superior empirical and model-building skills. 
In this connection I could not be more pleased by the panel of 
commentators who have written responses to this lecture.  They include some 
of the country’s leading political scientists who study the Court, and some of 
the country’s most astute legal observers of the Court.  To a man and woman, 
each of them has displayed an unusual degree of awareness of the work of the 
other discipline.  So this is a very auspicious group to inaugurate greater 
dialogue between these two disciplines about our collective understanding of 
an institution like the Supreme Court. 
Recent political science literature has advanced three different hypotheses 
about judicial behavior.12  I will draw upon each of these hypotheses in seeking 
to explain the two Rehnquist Courts, and, for good measure, toss in a fourth, 
which as far as I know has not been previously used to explain Supreme Court 
behavior. 
The first hypothesis of the political scientists, which is the most 
reductionistic, is called the attitudinal model.13  It hypothesizes that the Justices 
vote reflexively in each case for the outcome that conforms most closely to 
their personal public policy preferences.  Justices pay no attention to how other 
Justices are likely to vote or how other institutions are likely to react to their 
decisions.  Furthermore, they engage in no logrolling or vote trading, even 
implicitly.  Under this theory, the doctrine produced by the Court is a function 
of a summing of the individual policy preferences of each of the Justices. 
The second hypothesis, which I will call the internal strategic actor 
hypothesis, modifies the simple attitudinal model by pointing out that it takes a 
majority of sitting Justices to produce an opinion that is regarded as a legally 
binding precedent.14  Consequently, in an effort to produce such precedents, 
 
 12. For overviews, see LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Frank B. Cross, The Justices of 
Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511 (1998) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES 
JUSTICES MAKE (1998)). 
 13. See SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF 
PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992 (1995); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
 14. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12; FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW 
ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000). 
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Justices are likely to modify their personal preferences by taking into account 
the preferences of the other Justices, at least four of whom must be persuaded 
to go along to form a controlling opinion.  Under this theory, the doctrine 
produced by the Court will often be determined by the views of the median or 
“swing” Justice on any particular issue, with other Justices tempering their 
views to conform to those of the Justice with the critical fifth vote. 
The third hypothesis, which I will call the external strategic actor model, 
further modifies the inquiry by pointing out that the decisions reached by the 
Court are often subject to resistance from, or modification by, other political 
institutions such as Congress and the Executive.15  Thus, a Justice who cares 
about advancing his or her personal policy preferences will take into account 
the preferences of these other institutions.  Such an externally-oriented Justice 
will also want to consider public opinion, insofar as public opinion translates 
into potential opposition by other political institutions or into other reputational 
costs for Justices.  Under this theory, the doctrine produced by the Court is a 
function not only of the policy preferences of the Justices, but also of their 
assessment of how far those preferences are sustainable given the probable 
reaction of those outside the Court. 
Finally, I offer a fourth hypothesis, based on the differences between a 
Court experiencing extensive personnel changes, which I call a Court in flux, 
and a Court experiencing no personnel changes, which I call a Court in stasis.  
A Court in flux is more likely to change its institutional norms than a Court in 
stasis because new Justices are more likely to be the source of, and to be 
receptive to, new ideas about institutional behavior.  In contrast, a Court in 
stasis will have more collective information about the preferences of each of 
the Justices than will a Court in flux.  This should mean that the Justices on a 
Court in stasis will make fewer “mistakes” in predicting the positions of other 
Justices.  Similarly, the Justices on a Court in stasis will have participated in 
more decisions with the other Justices, which should allow bonds of 
cooperation to develop more fully than on a Court in flux. 
Each of these four hypotheses can be applied in intriguing ways to the 
contrasting behavior of the first and second Rehnquist Courts.  Indeed, if I 
accomplish nothing else in this lecture, I hope I can inspire political scientists 
to take up the differences in the Rehnquist Court before and after 1994 as an 
appropriate subject for further investigation.  My efforts at application will 
necessarily be tentative and impressionistic. 
Part II of the lecture develops in greater detail the case that there have been 
two Rehnquist Courts.  I focus in particular on five phenomena: differences in 
personnel and rates of change in personnel; differences in the number of cases 
heard by the Court; a shift in emphasis from cases presenting social issues to 
 
 15. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 138-77; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on 
History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991). 
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cases presenting issues of constitutional federalism; differences in the number 
of 5-4 decisions and the willingness of the Justices to adopt important legal 
innovations in 5-4 decisions; and differences in the number of plurality 
decisions. 
Part III takes up the attitudinal model.  At first blush, it might seem that 
this model would predict no change over the span of the Rehnquist Court.  The 
first Rehnquist Court started out with what has been characterized as a 5-4 
conservative/liberal split.  After the dust settled in 1994 and all the personnel 
changes were completed, the second Rehnquist Court was also characterized 
by a 5-4 conservative/liberal split.  When we look more closely at the 
personnel changes that occurred, however, we find a potentially significant 
juxtaposition.  Of the five conservatives who composed the majority in the 
original Rehnquist Court, one—Byron White—was, in fact, an old fashioned 
New Deal liberal.  White believed in judicial restraint in cases involving social 
issues, but he also believed in a strong federal government and was skeptical 
about claims of states’ rights.  This mix of beliefs translated into conservative 
votes on social issues like abortion and gay rights, but liberal votes on issues of 
separation of powers and federalism.  White’s replacement in the second 
Rehnquist Court, not directly, but indirectly, was Clarence Thomas.16  Thomas, 
like White, is a conservative on social issues, but, unlike White, he is also 
conservative on issues such a constitutional federalism.  Thus, at least one of 
the defining traits of the second Rehnquist Court—the emergence of an 
aggressively conservative jurisprudence in the area of constitutional 
federalism—can be explained in part by the substitution of Thomas for White. 
Justice Thomas, of course, is only one Justice out of a majority coalition of 
five.  In Part IV, I turn to the internal strategic actor hypothesis in order to 
consider whether it can account for the allegiance of other members of that 
coalition.  In particular, I will consider the possibility that the contrast between 
the first and second Rehnquist Courts can be attributed in part to the strategic 
behavior of Antonin Scalia.  When he joined the Court, Justice Scalia was an 
ardent proponent of the conservative agenda on social issues, but he was, at 
best, indifferent toward states’ rights.  A strategic actor who held these 
preferences would have rationally concentrated his energies during the first 
Rehnquist Court on social issues.  At that time, there was reason to believe 
that, with further retirements of liberal Justices and their replacement by 
Republican appointees, the Court would begin to achieve important substantive 
changes on issues like abortion, other privacy rights, affirmative action, and 
school prayer.  These hopes, however, were dashed.  The watershed decision in 
 
 16. Thomas, a conservative, replaced Thurgood Marshall, a liberal, in 1991.  White, a 
conservative, was replaced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a liberal, in 1993.  The net effect was a 
conservative for a conservative, and a liberal for a liberal. 
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey17 in 1992 revealed 
that Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter (all Republican appointees) did 
not support overruling Roe v. Wade.18  The retirement of Justice White in 1993 
doomed any further effort along these lines for the foreseeable future. 
In contrast to the grim prognosis on the social issues front in 1994, the 
prospect for doctrinal innovation in federalism cases was much brighter.  
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy had proven to be much more consistently 
supportive of states’ rights than of rolling back individual rights in areas 
involving social issues.  In these circumstances, a strategic actor in Justice 
Scalia’s position could rationally conclude that his first set of preferences—
social issues—should be put on the back burner, and his energies redirected to 
advancing what had theretofore been, at best, a secondary preference—states’ 
rights.  Although I have no conclusive evidence that Justice Scalia, in fact, 
made such a strategic choice, there is circumstantial evidence that something 
like this happened.  In any event, the Court altered its agenda in the mid-1990s 
away from social issues to federalism issues, and Justice Scalia, in alliance 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, 
became a steadfast proponent of limiting congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendments, and of erecting new 
protections for states’ rights in the name of the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments. 
In Part V, I turn to the third hypothesis of the political scientists—that the 
Justices take into account the views of external institutions and forces.  This 
theory maps very nicely onto the contrast between the first and second 
Rehnquist Courts because the transition in the Court’s behavior coincides 
almost exactly with a reversal in control of the Executive and the Legislative 
Branches of the federal government.  During the first Rehnquist Court, the 
Republicans controlled the White House and the Democrats controlled both 
Houses of Congress.  After Bill Clinton became President in 1993 and the 
Republicans took over Congress in the elections of 1994, this pattern was 
reversed.  Under the external strategic actor hypothesis, therefore, one would 
expect the first Rehnquist Court to follow the lead of the Executive Branch in 
moving the law as far as possible in a conservative direction without triggering 
a backlash from Congress, whereas the second Rehnquist Court would ignore 
the views of the Executive Branch and freely impose its own preferences, so 
long as these remain to the left of the views of the Republicans who control the 
key committees of Congress.  The evidence in support of this hypothesis, 
however, is weak.  In matters of statutory interpretation, where one would 
expect to see the most pronounced effect of a reversal of control of the 
Legislative and Executive branches, we see the exact opposite of what the 
 
 17. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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external strategic actor model would predict: the second Rehnquist Court was, 
in fact, more deferential to executive legal interpretations than was the first 
Rehnquist Court. 
On the other hand, it can plausibly be argued that public opinion played an 
important role in one of the key changes that led to the second Rehnquist 
Court: the “apostasy” of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in 1992 on 
abortion and school prayer.  In particular, the failed nomination of Robert 
Bork, the barely successful nomination of Clarence Thomas, and the adoption 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 revealed intense opposition to the conservative 
agenda on abortion, other privacy issues, and issues of race and gender 
discrimination.  This demonstration of hostile public opinion may have been 
enough to persuade the Court—or more accurately, its three moderate 
conservatives—either to abandon the conservative coalition altogether 
(Souter), or at least to steer clear of controversial rulings on social issues as 
much as possible (O’Connor and Kennedy).  This, more than any other theory, 
explains the shift away from the high-profile social issues cases to the more 
obscure issues of constitutional federalism, which tend to fly below the radar 
screen of public awareness. 
The fourth hypothesis, which is considered in Part VI, directs our attention 
to the different types of behaviors that are likely to prevail on a Court in stasis 
as opposed to a Court in flux.  This hypothesis can plausibly explain three of 
the differentiating characteristics between the first and second Rehnquist 
Courts.  First, the greater receptivity of a Court in flux to new institutional 
norms offers the best explanation of why the size of the Court’s docket shrank 
so dramatically during the years of the first Rehnquist Court.  Second, the 
superior collective information of a Court in stasis may account for the decline 
in plurality decisions on the second Rehnquist Court relative to the first.  
Lastly, the stronger commitment of coalition members to cooperation and 
reciprocity on a Court in stasis may explain why we see increasing numbers of 
5-4 decisions on the second Rehnquist Court, and why those decisions have 
increasingly announced significant legal innovations. 
II.  A PORTRAIT OF TWO COURTS 
There are, of course, a number of points of continuity over the sixteen-year 
span of the Rehnquist Court, as indeed there are points of continuity between 
the Rehnquist Court and the Burger Court—and as there will be between the 
Rehnquist Court and whatever follows it.  There are, however, also a striking 
number of differences between the Court that convened on the first Monday in 
October in 1986 and the Court that sits today.  Cumulatively, those differences 
are sufficiently great to justify speaking of two Rehnquist Courts—the first 
Rehnquist Court, which sat from the fall of 1986 to the summer of 1994, and 
the second Rehnquist Court, which has sat from the fall of 1994 to the present.  
At least that is the premise on which this lecture proceeds. 
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The most obvious difference—and the one that ultimately drives all 
others—is personnel.  The Court that adjourned in the summer of 1986 
contained six Justices who were no longer sitting when the Court convened in 
October 1994.  In fact, the first point of contrast between the two Courts is that 
the first Rehnquist Court was characterized by a fairly steady rate of turnover 
in personnel—six replacements in eight years—whereas the second Rehnquist 
Court has been characterized by a nearly unprecedented stability in 
membership—no changes in over eight years.  Not since the 1820s has a single 
group of Justices sat together for such a long unbroken period of time, and the 
Court of the 1820s contained only seven Justices.19  The basic contrast between 
a Court in flux and a Court of fixed composition will serve as a critical variable 
in my efforts in Part VI to explain the differences between the two Courts. 
One might think that a turnover of six Justices in eight years would 
produce a significant shift in the political orientation of the Court.  Indeed, 
given the way the retirements were spaced, the conservatives should have 
picked up one seat.  Three retirements were from the conservative wing and 
three were from the liberal wing.  They were replaced by four Justices 
nominated by Republican Presidents—two by Reagan and two by Bush 
senior—and two by a Democratic President—Clinton.  In theory, therefore, the 
Republican Presidents should have been able to gain one conservative seat on 
the Court.  This did not happen, however, because of a miscalculation by the 
first Bush Administration.  President Bush replaced the retiring Justice William 
Brennan—the leader of the liberal wing—with David Souter—a reclusive and 
little-known judge from New Hampshire.  After a couple years of uncertainty, 
Souter fell in with the liberal camp, where he remains firmly ensconced today.  
The upshot is that three conservatives were replaced by three other 
conservatives, and three liberals were replaced by three other liberals, so the 
general political balance on the Court remained undisturbed.  Figure 1 on the 
next page summarizes the changes in personnel that have occurred during the 
years of the Rehnquist Court. 
 
 19. See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting 
the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 MINN. L. REV. 131, 134 n.12 (2001). 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Changes in Court Personnel, 1987-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning from personnel changes, perhaps the most striking difference in 
institutional behavior between the first and second Rehnquist Courts concerns 
the number of cases decided on the merits.  During all the years of the Burger 
Court and up through the first year of the Rehnquist Court, the Court decided 
about 150 cases per year.  During the years of the second Rehnquist Court, the 
Court has decided only about half that many cases.  For seasoned observers, 
this is a truly stunning development.  In the 1970s and 1980s, it was commonly 
assumed that 150 cases per year was the outer limit of the Court’s capacity, 
and that a serious problem was presented by the inability of the Court to go 
beyond this limit.20  For the last eight years—the years of the second Rehnquist 
Court—the Court has been operating at about half this capacity.  This is 
vividly illustrated by the Court’s daily schedule.  The Court’s schedule is 
designed on the assumption that the Court will hear two argued cases in the 
morning, take a one-hour break for lunch, and then hear two argued cases in 
the afternoon.  The second Rehnquist Court has only rarely needed an 
 
 20. See Peter L. Strauss, One-Hundred-Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093 (1987). 
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afternoon argument session.  The Justices break for lunch and call it quits for 
the day. 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
Opinions Written by Term, 1986-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 above traces the decline in the number of cases decided by the 
Rehnquist Court on a year-by-year basis.21  We see that the second Rehnquist 
Court is readily distinguishable from the first by the fact that it generates a 
much smaller body of precedent.  In theory, the decisions it renders could have 
greater impact because the Court can devote more time to each case.  As we 
shall see, the second Rehnquist Court does produce fewer plurality decisions 
than the first Rehnquist Court.  It is debatable, however, whether the second 
Rehnquist Court otherwise is writing opinions of greater clarity or sweep than 
its predecessors.22  What is clear is that a Court that writes half as many 
 
 21. The numbers are taken from the statistics compiled in the annual Supreme Court volume 
of the Harvard Law Review published each November.  They reflect a category that the Review 
calls “opinions written,” which varies slightly from cases orally argued because it includes some 
per curiam decisions in which the Court does not hear argument and excludes some cases that are 
dismissed after argument without a decision.  See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The 
Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453 (2002). 
 22. It does appear that opinions have become longer over time.  Full Court opinions by the 
Rehnquist Court are on average more than twice as long as full Court opinions during the Taft 
Court (1921-28).  See Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, 
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opinions necessarily has fewer occasions to influence policy.  Why a Court 
would abdicate power in this fashion is a central mystery of the second 
Rehnquist Court. 
Sheer numbers of decisions are one thing.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
nature of the legal issues resolved by the Court—its legal agenda—is also 
significantly different before and after 1994.  To be sure, we inevitably find a 
substantial degree of continuity with the past.  The second Rehnquist Court, 
like the first—and like previous Courts—decides a mixture of constitutional 
and nonconstitutional cases.  The constitutional cases present a wide diversity 
of issues, ranging from procedural protections for criminal defendants, to free 
speech, to government takings of property, to disputes about relations between 
the federal government and the states and among the three branches of the 
federal government.  Yet, if we focus only on the relatively thin slice of 
constitutional cases that generate the most public comment and controversy, 
we find a significant shift in emphasis between the first and second Rehnquist 
Courts. 
The shift can be illustrated by considering two “baskets” of issues, one 
which I will call the “social issues” basket, and the other the “federalism” 
basket.  The social issues basket includes cases involving constitutional 
protection of abortion, other privacy rights such as parental rights and the right 
to die, affirmative action, gay rights, and government speech on religious 
topics (for example, school prayer and crèches in city hall).  These are the 
“culture war” issues that sharply divide liberal urban elites and the 
predominantly rural and suburban religious right.23  The federalism basket 
includes cases involving the scope of federal power under the Commerce 
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth Amendment 
limitations on federal power, and state immunity from suit associated with the 
Eleventh Amendment.  These cases are perceived, at least by most nonlawyers, 
as presenting relatively technical issues whose relevance to questions of public 
 
Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1281 (2001). 
Even more striking, however, is the rise of dissenting (and concurring) opinions.  During the Taft 
Court, 84% of opinions were unanimous; today that number has fallen to 27%.  Id. at 1283. 
 23. The judgment about what issues to include in the “social issues” basket is a subjective 
one, and other observers might quarrel with my exclusion of certain categories of cases, such as 
obscenity cases, death penalty cases, other types of Establishment Clause cases (such as school 
vouchers), and perhaps even cases involving legislative redistricting.  I have selected the issues to 
include in the social issues basket based upon my judgment about those issues that present the 
sharpest and most intense divisions within society.  Although obscenity, the death penalty, and so 
forth are divisive, they do not pose the same sharp cleavage along “culture war” lines as do the 
issues I have included.  For example, many feminists support stronger regulation of obscenity, 
and new Democrats like Bill Clinton support the death penalty.  In any event, if the social issues 
basket was expanded to include issues like obscenity and the death penalty, we would still see a 
shift away from these issues between the first and second Rehnquist Courts, although the shift 
would not be as pronounced as it is when we focus on my narrow definition of social issues. 
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policy is not immediately apparent.  Figure 3 below presents a histogram that 
compares the relative distribution of social issues and federalism issues 
between the first and second Rehnquist Courts.  With respect to the social 
issues basket, it shows a decline of nearly 50% in the number of significant 
cases decided—from seventeen during the first eight years to just nine in the 
second eight years.  In contrast, with respect to the federalism basket, the 
number of significant cases nearly doubled—from thirteen in the first eight 
years to twenty-five in the second eight years.24 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
Relative Frequency of Social Issues and Federalism Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When we go beyond a purely quantitative analysis and consider the role 
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 24. The cases used to generate Figure 3 are listed in Appendix A at the end of this lecture. 
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to an abortion;25 the second Rehnquist Court heard only one such case in eight 
years.26  This understates, however, the degree to which abortion was a 
dominating theme of the first Rehnquist Court and yet has had only a shadowy 
presence in the second.  There was high drama in the first Rehnquist Court 
over the question whether the Court would overrule Roe v. Wade,27 its 
landmark 1973 decision that first recognized a constitutional right to abortion.  
The Reagan Administration asked the Court to overrule Roe at the tail end of 
the Burger Court,28 and again in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services29 in 
the opening years of the Rehnquist Court.  Four Justices signaled a willingness 
to do so.  The Bush administration persisted in the assault on Roe, until the 
Court, in its dramatic decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,30 reaffirmed the basic holding in Roe. 
With the Casey decision, the Court clearly lost its appetite for high stakes 
abortion controversies.  With the exception of Stenberg v. Carhart,31 where a 
square circuit conflict left it no choice but to rule on the constitutionality of 
partial birth abortion bans, the second Rehnquist Court has avoided public 
debate about abortion rights.  The second Rehnquist Court has, in fact, decided 
a number of cases involving abortion rights; however, with the exception of 
Stenberg, it has done so in per curium opinions without hearing argument.32  It 
is most unusual for the Court to resolve substantive constitutional issues in this 
fashion.  Moreover, the Court has continued to decide cases at the periphery of 
the abortion controversy, such as those involving civil and criminal 
prosecutions of anti-abortion demonstrators.33  It clearly has no interest, 
however, in reengaging in a publicly visible way with the core question of 
whether or to what extent abortion is a substantively protected right. 
 
 25. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 26. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 27. 410 U.S. 133 (1973). 
 28. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obsts. & Gyns., 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 29. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 30. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 31. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 32. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) (5-4 summary reversal of Ninth Circuit 
decision on parental consent issue); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (5-4 summary 
reversal of Ninth Circuit decision invalidating statute requiring presence of physician at abortion); 
Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning, 516 U.S. 474 (1996) (unanimous per curiam reversal of 
injunction against state abortion funding cutoff on the ground of the order’s overbreadth). 
 33. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (First Amendment challenge to state 
statute prohibiting protesters from approaching persons entering a clinic); Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (First Amendment challenge to judicial order imposing 
separation between anti-abortion demonstrators and clinic patrons and employees); NOW, Inc. v. 
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (civil RICO action against abortion opponents). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] THE MAKING OF THE SECOND REHNQUIST COURT 583 
Affirmative action presents, in broad outline, a similar picture.  The 
permissibility of affirmative action was a critical issue during the late years of 
the Burger Court, and the Rehnquist Court decided four such cases during its 
first eight years.34  The Court was sharply divided in these cases, each of which 
was decided by the narrowest margin, with some decisions upholding 
affirmative action programs and others striking them down.  In 1995, the Court 
decided the only affirmative action case to date by the second Rehnquist 
Court.35  Again, the Court was sharply divided.  In a 5-4 decision, it ruled that 
affirmative action programs designed to assist racial minorities are subject to a 
standard of strict scrutiny.  The Court declined to apply this standard to the 
case at hand, however, and instead remanded to the lower courts for ultimate 
disposition, with the result that the ruling had an abstract quality about it.  With 
that, the Court fell silent on the issue.36 
There are a variety of explanations for the disappearance of affirmative 
action cases from the Court’s docket, and the evidence is mixed about whether 
the Court is really trying to avoid the issue.37  For whatever reasons, however, 
the general picture of inactivity is clear.  After a period in which the Court was 
vigorously, if somewhat chaotically, engaged with the issue of affirmative 
action, it entered a period in which the issue disappeared from the docket for 
seven years.38 
 
 34. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469 (1989); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
 35. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 36. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests: Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 260 (2002) (documenting divisions in 
lower courts in the wake of cryptic decision in Adarand). 
 37. Action by the Solicitor General has been important in keeping affirmative action off the 
Court’s agenda.  In the Clinton years, the Solicitor General sought unsuccessfully to keep the 
Court from reviewing one prominent affirmative action case, Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 
F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).  When the Court granted review anyway, a collection of 
interest groups supporting affirmative action came up with enough money to induce the 
respondent to settle her legal action, and the School Board to drop its appeal.  See Linda R. Cohen 
& Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 391, 399 (2000).  This episode suggests that the demise of affirmative action 
decisions has more to do with agenda manipulation by litigants than with the Court’s own 
reluctance to rule on the issue.  More recently, the second Bush Administration urged the Court, 
after it had granted review for a second time in Adarand, to dismiss the case as improvidently 
granted, which the Court did.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).  
This suggests perhaps that the Presidents of both parties would prefer to avoid a definitive ruling 
about affirmative action.  Overall, the Adarand saga hardly suggests that the Court wants to keep 
affirmative action off its agenda.  Not only did the Court grant review in the case twice, but an 
intermediate per curiam decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000), kept 
the case alive by overturning a lower court’s ruling that the controversy had become moot. 
 38. This dry spell will evidently come to an end this Term, as the Court has agreed to resolve 
a conflict in the circuits over the constitutionality of minority preference programs at public 
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Cases involving government speech on religious topics reflect a somewhat 
similar pattern.  For a time, it appeared that the Court would disavow the three-
part test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman39 and permit religious expression by 
government provided it could not be said to coerce observance of religious 
belief.40  These hopes, however, were thwarted in Lee v. Weisman,41 where the 
Court, speaking through Justice Kennedy, reaffirmed that prayers may not be 
spoken in public schools—including nondenominational prayers offered at 
graduation ceremonies.  Two other Reagan-Bush appointees, Justices 
O’Connor and Souter, joined the Kennedy opinion in Lee, making it unlikely 
that the Court will revisit this position in the foreseeable future.42 
The second Rehnquist Court has continued to be active on the 
Establishment Clause front, but the most frequently litigated issues have 
centered on questions of access of religious schools to government funding, 
and of religious groups to government facilities.  In these cases, the Rehnquist 
majority has continued to push toward greater accommodation of religion in 
public life.43  Meanwhile, cases involving government speech on religious 
topics—probably the most explosive issue under the Establishment Clause—
have gone quietly away. 
When we turn from the second Rehnquist Court’s reticence to engage with 
social issues to federalism issues, a very different picture emerges.  Consider 
the cases presenting questions about the scope of congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Important 
decisions construing the scope of these powers have been rendered from time-
to-time throughout the Court’s history; but, for whatever reasons, no such 
decisions were handed down during the first Rehnquist Court.  The second 
 
universities.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 602 (2002); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 617 
(2002). 
 39. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  The three-part test requires that the challenged law have a secular 
purpose; that its primary effect be neither to advance or inhibit religion; and that it not foster 
excessive entanglement with religion.  Id. at 612-13. 
 40. For example, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), a badly splintered 
Court invalidated a crèche display in the stairwell of one public building, but upheld a display 
with a Christmas tree and menorah outside a different building.  Justice O’Connor, concurring, 
declined to use the Lemon test and instead urged an endorsement standard.  Id. at 624-25.  The 
four Justices that joined a dissenting opinion by Justice Kennedy, which pointedly criticized the 
Lemon test, would have upheld both displays because they did not entail any coercion of religious 
belief.  Id. at 659-63. 
 41. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 42. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grument, 512 U.S. 687, 750-51 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing ruefully that his prediction in dissent in Lee v. Weisman that the 
Lemon test would soon be discarded had been premature). 
 43. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 
793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
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Rehnquist Court has now rendered eight decisions construing the scope of 
Congress’s power under these two grants.44 
The emergence of these issues is not an accident.  The Court moved 
eagerly to put issues about federalism on its agenda.  The most striking 
example is Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,45 where the petition for 
certiorari sought review of a decision holding that Congress has more limited 
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce 
Clause than under the Interstate Commerce Clause.  The possibility that the 
decision would be used as a vehicle to reconsider Pennsylvania v. Union Gas 
Co.,46 which had held five years before that Congress does have power to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause, was 
barely mentioned in the briefs of the parties.  Nevertheless, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion framed the issue broadly in a way that Union Gas was 
placed squarely in issue, and the Court proceeded to overrule that decision.47 
More important than the Court’s agenda is what the Court does in the cases 
that appear on its agenda.  The judgment here is necessarily a subjective one, 
but it is my sense that the second Rehnquist Court has enunciated a larger 
quotient of new doctrine in important areas of the law than did the first 
Rehnquist Court.  Certainly this is true in the two areas of contrasting 
emphasis—social issues and federalism.  Notwithstanding its relative 
preoccupation with social issues, the first Rehnquist Court did not stake out 
much new ground in this area.  Its leading abortion precedent, Casey,48 did not 
produce an opinion for the Court, is defensive in tone, and is best reviewed as a 
partial retrenchment from prior law rather than a new departure.  In the 
affirmative action area, the Court succeeded largely in sowing confusion.  In 
the privacy cases raising issues other than abortion, the Court swung back and 
 
 44. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Section 5); Solid 
Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) 
(Commerce Clause); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (Commerce Clause); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Commerce Clause and Section 5); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Section 5); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Section 5); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
(Section 5); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause). 
 45. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 46. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 47. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 66.  Similar aggressiveness can be seen in United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the decision that inaugurated a new restrictive approach to 
interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause.  The lower court had declared the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act unconstitutional on the narrow ground that Congress had made no findings 
connecting the possession of a gun near a school with interstate commerce.  See United States v. 
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1362-66 (5th Cir. 1993).  The Supreme Court granted review and affirmed 
on much broader grounds, citing the absence of findings as only one element in support of its 
ruling.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-66. 
 48. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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forth between intervention and deference, and engaged in an inconclusive 
debate about the role of tradition in defining the scope of substantive due 
process rights.49  With respect to public accommodation of religion, numerous 
Justices criticized but could never muster a majority for overruling Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,50 and the Court ended up reaffirming a rule of strict separation in 
cases involving public expression on religious topics. 
In contrast, the second Rehnquist Court has struck out boldly in its area of 
preferred activity.  The Court’s doctrinal innovations, primarily in the 
federalism area, have resulted in an unprecedented outpouring of decisions 
holding Acts of Congress unconstitutional.51  It has adopted a new 
“commercial activities” limitation on the “affecting commerce” rationale for 
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause,52 and a new “congruence and 
proportionality” limitation on Congress’s powers under Section 5.53  The 
greater capacity of the second Rehnquist Court to generate new doctrine is 
especially striking in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  The first Rehnquist 
Court was actually fairly active in the Eleventh Amendment area,54 but its 
decisions mostly relied on a clear statement rule that was, in turn, rather poorly 
rationalized.55  The second Rehnquist Court has established that the Eleventh 
Amendment incorporates a principle that Congress has no power to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity under its Article I powers,56 that the principle is 
binding on state courts as well as federal courts,57 and that it applies to federal 
administrative agencies as well as federal courts.58  Although the soundness of 
 
 49. Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (striking down state prison regulation that 
prohibited marriages by inmates as a violation of substantive due process), with Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding against a substantive due process attack a state law 
denying visitation rights to biological father of child born to woman married to another man). 
 50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 51. See Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1974 (2001) (noting 
that only 127 federal laws were struck down by the Court in the first two hundred years of its 
existence—a rate of about 0.6 per year—whereas in the six years after 1995, 26 different federal 
statutes were invalidated—a rate of 4.3 per year). 
 52. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-11, 613 (2000). 
 53. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 54. See cases listed infra Appendix A. 
 55. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 (1985).  Probably the best 
justification for a clear statement rule in this context is that it is necessary for the States to protect 
themselves through the political process.  The Court advanced this justification in the context of 
statutory interpretation, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991), but did not extend this 
reasoning to Eleventh Amendment decisions. 
 56. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 57. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 58. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
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these developments is debatable,59 there is no question that the Court has 
struck out in bold new directions and has vigorously defended its vision of the 
importance of state sovereign immunity in the constitutional scheme. 
A further area of contrast concerns the prominence and stability of certain 
voting blocs. The Rehnquist Court started out divided between five 
conservatives and four liberals, and it remains divided in the same proportions 
today.  As many commentators have observed, however, a very high 
percentage of the controversial decisions rendered by the second Rehnquist 
Court are 5-4 divisions that track exactly the 5-4 conservative/liberal split.  
Quantitative analysis seems to confirm this.  Looking at data on all cases 
decided on the merits during the second Rehnquist Court, Paul Edelman and 
Jim Chen report that the conservative bloc has rendered nearly half of the 
Court’s 5-4 decisions since 1994.60  The dominance of the conservative bloc is 
underscored by the fact that the only other configurations of 5-4 occurring with 
any frequency are those in which either Justice O’Connor or Justice Kennedy 
peals off and joins the liberal foursome.  In fact, putting aside the three most 
frequently observed coalitions—the conservative bloc and two alliances 
consisting of the liberals plus either Justice O’Connor or Justice Kennedy 
defecting from the conservative bloc—no other coalition of five appears with 
more than a trivial degree of frequency.61  Clearly, the second Rehnquist Court 
is divided into two camps, in which two Justices (O’Connor and Kennedy) are 
somewhat more weakly attached to the majority than are the other three 
Members. 
 
 59. For an especially cogent critique, arguing that the Court has gone overboard on 
immunity federalism at the expense of process federalism, see Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign 
Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
 60. Edelman & Chen, supra note 19, at 178-79. 
 61. Id. at 179. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Percent distribution of 5-4 decisions by coalition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 above offers a different perspective on this phenomenon, 
presenting data on the percentage of cases decided 5-4 for each Term of the 
Rehnquist Court from 1986 to the present, and the fraction of those cases in 
which the majority consists entirely of conservative Justices.62  The data reveal 
that bloc voting by conservatives is not new.  Significant percentages of cases 
were decided by five-member conservative majorities in 1986, 1988, and 1989; 
however, the frequency of 5-4 conservative blocs fluctuates widely during the 
first Rehnquist Court, and, of course, because the composition of the Court was 
changing during these years, these are different conservative blocs from year-
to-year.  In one year, 1992, there were three different combinations of 5-4 
conservative blocs within a single year.  Thus, the 5-4 conservative majorities 
in these years do not have the same monolithic quality as the 5-4 conservative 
majorities during the second Rehnquist Court.  Moreover, note that the 
percentage of 5-4 cases gradually increased in the late 1990s, reaching an all-
time high of 31% in the 2000 Term,63 with the dominant conservative coalition 
responsible for 17% of all decided cases in that year.  This provides some 
 
 62. By expressing the numbers as percentages of all merits cases instead of absolute 
numbers, we adjust for the declining numbers of merits cases decided over the sixteen-year 
period. 
 63. For a complete tabulation of the percentage of 5-4 decisions up to 1990, see Robert E. 
Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 1900-1990, 
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 711-12 tbl.1 (1993). 
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evidence that the conservative majority is, in fact, becoming stronger and is 
controlling an increasing percentage of the decisions on the Court’s docket. 
A final area of contrast between the first and second Rehnquist Courts 
concerns the frequency with which five Justices are unable to agree on a single 
rationale for the disposition of a case.  Such cases usually result in the 
judgment of the Court being announced by what is called a “plurality opinion,” 
so we can call them plurality decisions for short.  Plurality decisions are 
generally thought to be undesirable because they are weak precedents.  The 
judgment of the Court in such a case is legally binding, but it is a precedent 
only to the extent of the “narrowest” rationale advanced in support of it by one 
or more Justices.64  This could be the plurality opinion, or it could be a 
concurring opinion.  Often it will be difficult to determine which of two or 
more opinions provides the narrowest rationale supporting the judgment.  
Consequently, plurality decisions frequently lead to disagreements among 
lower courts and require further clarification by the Supreme Court.  Not 
surprisingly, they are more prone to being overruled than are other types of 
precedents.65 
One might think that as the frequency of 5-4 dispositions on a Court rises, 
the number of plurality decisions would also rise, since both are indicative of 
internal division on the Court.  In fact, however, the opposite has happened on 
the Rehnquist Court, as summarized in Figure 5 on the next page.  The first 
Rehnquist Court was much more prone to fragmenting in a way that resulted in 
a plurality decision than is the second Rehnquist Court.  Indeed, in the first 
Rehnquist Court, over 9% of argued cases resulted in plurality decisions, and 
in one year, 1988-89, seventeen cases failed to generate a majority opinion—
nearly 13% of all cases decided that year.  In the second Rehnquist Court, by 
contrast, plurality decisions have fallen to just 6% of decided cases, and in the 
last two Terms the number of plurality opinions has fallen to very low levels.  
In fact, in the 2000 Term—the year of Bush v. Gore66—the second Rehnquist 
Court produced only one plurality decision, an astonishing feat given the 
pressures under which the Court was operating that year.  When we plot the 
three-year rolling percentage of all decisions that are plurality decisions (to 
smooth out the kinks), we see that the percentage does not change much up 
through the 1995 Term, but it then moves down gradually, yet perceptibly, 
during the later years of the second Rehnquist Court. 
 
 
 64. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).  See Mark A. Thurmon, When the 
Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 
DUKE L.J. 419 (1992). 
 65. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania 
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), and citing as one reason that the prior precedent was only a 
plurality decision). 
 66. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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FIGURE 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If one were to pick one word to describe the second Rehnquist Court, it 
might be “disciplined.”  The Court is obviously very closely divided on many 
issues, but it has reduced the size of its case load, avoided getting much 
involved in controversial social issues, concentrated on areas where five 
Justices agree on the outcome, and minimized the amount of effort wasted on 
decisions that fail to generate a single majority opinion.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist presides over a well-oiled machine that, without undue effort, 
churns out legal doctrine he largely finds congenial.67  It is quite a contrast to 
the frustrating spectacle presented by the first Rehnquist Court.  It remains to 
explain how it happened that the Court was transformed in this fashion, 
sometime around the summer of 1994. 
III.  THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL: THE THOMAS-FOR-WHITE SWITCH 
In order to give some structure to our search for explanations for the 
differences between the first and second Rehnquist Courts, it will be useful to 
draw upon some hypotheses that political scientists have developed in studying 
judicial behavior.  The dominant hypothesis of the political scientists, at least 
until quite recently, has been what is known as the attitudinal model.  This 
model posits that the Justices vote in each case for the outcome that 
 
 67. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on Docket, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2001, at A1  (“In the term that marked the chief justice’s 30th anniversary on the 
bench, the court moved far toward accomplishing his long-term goals . . . .”). 
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corresponds with their individual policy preferences.68 By “policy 
preferences,” attitudinal theorists have tended to mean political preferences in 
a fairly narrow partisan sense.  Thus, some Justices are said to be “liberals,” 
meaning that they prefer expansive interpretations of civil rights, strict 
protection of the rights of criminal defendants, and aggressive government 
regulation of the economy; other Justices are said to be “conservatives,” 
meaning that they favor narrow interpretations of civil rights, broad discretion 
for police and prosecutors, and protections for private property rights.69 
Lawyers have generally reacted with hostility to attitudinal literature, 
finding that it reflects an overly-crude picture of judicial decision making.70  
The critics say it caricatures the Supreme Court as nothing more than a body of 
nine legislators unconstrained by the need to stand for election.  Although 
lawyers occasionally grouse about the Court in similar terms, they know that 
this is not a complete picture of how the Court operates.  For example, the 
attitudinal model has no way of explaining the constraining force of the 
language of authoritative texts and precedent in judicial decision making, not 
to mention the importance of doctrines pertaining to jurisdiction and 
justiciability. 
More recent political science literature suggests, however, that the defining 
feature of the attitudinal model is not the crude depiction of Justices as being 
motivated solely by partisan preferences.  Rather, the distinguishing feature of 
the theory is the assumption that judges vote reflexively in each case; that is, 
they cast their votes based solely on their individual reactions to the facts and 
legal issues presented, rather than by considering, in addition, how other 
judges or institutions are likely to react to the decision.71  The key premise of 
the attitudinal model, in other words, is that judges behave nonstrategically. 
Once we see that the attitudinal model is, at its core, a hypothesis of 
reflexive behavior, then the question of how we depict the “policy preferences” 
of the Justices becomes a contingent feature of the model that can vary in 
accordance with the demands of the empirics.  The traditional model of the 
attitudinalists, in which every Justice is either a monolithic “liberal” or a 
“conservative” concerned only with influencing public policy, is simply one, 
highly reductionistic version of “policy preferences.”  This kind of 
 
 68. See BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 13, at 60; Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the 
Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992). 
 69. See, e.g., BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 13, at 89 n.1. 
 70. In fact, the originators of the attitudinal theory drew upon behaviorist psychology, 
suggesting that judicial behavior corresponds to a psychological model of stimulus and response.  
The facts of a case are like a “stimulus” to the Justice, and the vote of the Justice in the case is the 
“response.”  Show a Justice a brief that indicates the case involves a labor controversy, and the 
Justice will vote reflexively for the union side or the management side, depending on whether he 
or she is “liberal” or “conservative.” 
 71. See Cross, supra note 12. 
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reductionism can be useful in certain kinds of studies, for example, ones that 
look at very large numbers of cases presenting particular issues like abortion or 
the death penalty over a long period of time.  It does not necessarily follow, 
however, that a more nuanced conception of “policy preferences” is 
inconsistent with the attitudinal theory.  In particular, there is no reason why 
one cannot include in the definition of policy preferences a Justice’s judicial 
philosophy, including such variables as whether the Justice inclines more 
toward interpreting the Constitution according to its original or its evolved 
meaning, or inclines more or less toward following precedent.72  Adding these 
more lawyer-like attributes into the mix obviously makes life more 
complicated for the number-crunchers, so there may be reasons to reject these 
refinements as part of a particular study; however, there is nothing inherent in 
the attitudinal model that compels us to adopt a cartoon-like conception of 
judging, provided we are willing to suffer the consequences of a more 
complicated set of independent variables. 
Once we understand the attitudinal model to be about reflexive, that is, 
nonstrategic, behavior, we can also see that there is nothing “tautological” 
about seeking to ascertain a Justice’s preferences by examining his or her 
voting record and opinions as a Justice, as the traditional attitudinalists have 
sometimes suggested.73  Rather, we can view each decision of the Court as a 
little window that allows us to peer into the revealed beliefs and attitudes of the 
Justices.  Armed with this information, we can make generalizations about 
those beliefs and attitudes, and use these generalizations to predict how each 
Justice is likely to vote and write in future cases that present similar issues.74  
The key to the attitudinal model is not the source of our information about 
judicial preferences; rather, it is the hypothesis that the Justices act reflexively 
in seeking to implement those preferences. 
From the attitudinal perspective, the decisive variable in explaining the 
behavior of the Court is composition of the Court, and, in particular, the policy 
preferences of the majority bloc of Justices.  If the Rehnquist Court has 
changed its behavior during the sixteen years of its existence, the attitudinal 
model would suggest that the place to look in explaining this change is to 
consider whether there has been a change in the policy preferences (understood 
for my purposes to include judicial philosophy) of the members of the majority 
bloc. 
 
 72. For an insightful discussion contrasting judicial preferences and judicial judgments, see 
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 85-89 
(1986). 
 73. Cf. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 11 (also insisting that the goals of Justices 
must be specified independently of their behavior). 
 74. For an example of a recent study that proceeds this way (more systematically than I do) 
in developing a measure of Justices’ preferences, see Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated 
Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 559-60 (1999). 
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The change of greatest potential relevance was the replacement of Justice 
White by Justice Thomas, which was completed when White retired in 1993.75  
Justice White is often described as an inscrutable figure who approached each 
case on its own terms without any overriding philosophy of government or 
theory of the judicial role; however, I think this is incorrect.  The view of 
White as lacking any theoretical commitments is primarily a reflection of his 
unwillingness to give speeches or write law review articles, and of the terse, 
doggedly legalistic style of his opinions.76  However, when one steps back and 
views the overall sweep of his judicial career, a reasonably clear pattern 
emerges.  White was a New Deal liberal who basically shared the 
jurisprudence (but not the rhetorical style) of Felix Frankfurter.77  Thus, he 
believed that the Constitution should be interpreted flexibly in order to allow 
Congress to create new types of administrative structures in response to 
unanticipated economic and social problems.78  He believed that it was the 
mission of the federal government to redress problems of economic inequality, 
as by encouraging the use of collective bargaining and restricting the abuse of 
 
 75. I put aside the replacement of Justice Powell by Justice Kennedy in 1987.  This is not 
because there are no intriguing contrasts between these two men.  Rather, it is because the 
Kennedy-for-Powell switch occurred after just one year of the Rehnquist Court, and, thus, for 
practical purposes Justice Kennedy has been a fixture of the Court throughout its duration.  
Certainly, one cannot attribute any of the differences between the first Rehnquist Court and 
second Rehnquist Court to the substitution of Kennedy for Powell. 
 76. My characterization of White draws upon the fine biography by Dennis Hutchinson.  See 
DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE (1998).  On White’s lack 
of extrajudicial writings, see id. at 330 (noting that at the time of White’s nomination to the 
Supreme Court “[t]here was no written record to review, since White had given only six speeches 
as deputy attorney general and none touched on judicial review or allied issues”).  On White’s 
opinion-writing style, see, for example, id. at 356 (“[M]ost of White’s opinions are precise, 
methodical, and impatient to finish the job. . . . There are few lapidary lines or memorable turns 
of phrase.”); id. at 363 (“White wrote opinions that were often densely presented and no better 
than implicit about their theoretical premises.”). 
 77. Hutchinson resists the notion that White was a New Dealer, although he admits that there 
were “chords” from the New Deal “that resonate insistently throughout White’s judicial career—
primarily his unswerving nationalism and his belief that judges should be wary of making social 
policy, particularly in comprehensive terms, without clear congressional authorization.”  Id. at 
446-47. 
 78. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (defending 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as a novel solution to budgetary issues); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (defending constitutionality of legislative veto); N. 
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 94 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) 
(supporting Congress’s power to create special bankruptcy courts); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
258 (1976) (White, J., dissenting in part) (defending the “undoubted power of Congress to 
vindicate the strong public interest” in fair elections through creation of novel Commission 
formed of officers appointed by both executive and legislative branches). 
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private monopoly power.79  Moreover, he supported efforts by the government 
to end segregated schooling and other forms of invidious discrimination 
against minorities.80  He had little interest or patience, however, with the idea 
that an unelected judiciary should identify new rights that have not been 
marked as such by established democratic processes, whether it be new 
criminal procedural rights, First Amendment rights, or privacy rights.81  This 
was to invite the sort of judicial meddling with majoritarian politics that had 
threatened to undo the New Deal in the mid-1930s.82 
Justice White remained steadfast in these views, even as the issues of the 
1960s gave way to those of the 1970s and 1980s.83  Under the new conception 
of judicial politics that eventually emerged during the Burger Court years, a 
“liberal” came to be defined as a judge who participates enthusiastically in the 
creation of new rights, whether it be abortion rights, protections for gays and 
lesbians, affirmative action remedies, or procedural protections for death 
penalty defendants, without regard to whether these interests have been marked 
off as warranting heightened protection by legislative majorities or 
supermajorities.  A “conservative” is a judge who opposes the recognition of 
 
 79. See, e.g., Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 490 
(1989) (White, J.) (vacating injunction against RR strike); Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982) (White, J.) (invalidating employers’ attempt to withdraw from 
collective bargaining process); Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (White, 
J.) (condemning price discrimination despite competitors’ increase in profits); United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (White, J.) (holding union minimum wage platform 
exempt from Sherman Act claims). 
 80. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (White, J.) (upholding novel 
desegregation decree that required local authorities to raise taxes to improve quality of schools); 
N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (White, J.) (upholding ordinance 
prohibiting discrimination by private clubs); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (White, J.) 
(invalidating state referendum as sanctioning private discrimination in housing).  Cf. Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (White, J.) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act in such a way as to narrow application of the disparate impact test). 
 81. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J.) (stating that the level of 
protection afforded to private sexual conduct should properly be determined by state legislative 
decisions rather than through a judicially constructed “fundamental” right at odds with history 
and tradition); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (White, J.) (maintaining that the basis 
for a “newsman’s privilege” from subpoena rests on legislative determinations of fact rather than 
judicial interpretation of the First Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) 
(White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has not discovered or found the law in making today’s 
decision, nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to make new law 
and new public policy . . . .”). 
 82. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (White, J.) (“The Court is most vulnerable and comes 
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no 
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.  That this is so was painfully 
demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930’s. . . .”). 
 83. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 76, at 445 (noting the essential continuity in White’s 
positions while on the Court). 
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these sorts of new rights.  Some Justices, such as Brennan and Marshall, and in 
their later years Blackmun and Stevens, made successful adjustments to the 
new conception of progressive judging.  White, however, did not.  Thus, White 
came to be labeled a conservative, almost exclusively because of his stance on 
social issues, which, in turn, was a product of his philosophy of judicial 
restraint.  The fact that White continued to support a powerful federal 
government, legal protection of labor unions, tough enforcement of antitrust 
laws, and vigorous implementation of desegregation decrees was deemed 
inconsequential under the popular mode of classification that emerged during 
this time. 
In contrast to White, Clarence Thomas can only be described as 
conservative through-and-through.  Thomas was raised by his grandparents in 
a strict religious household that instilled respect for traditional virtues of hard 
work and obedience to authority.84  No doubt the roots of his conservatism can 
be found in this background; however, Thomas’s behavior as a Justice can be 
fully understood only against the backdrop of his extraordinary confirmation 
experience.  Before his nomination, Thomas had drawn attention to himself 
while serving as Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for 
his public denunciation of affirmative action and intimations of opposition to 
Roe v. Wade.85  At his confirmation hearings, however, Thomas sought to 
avoid any scrutiny of his views on controversial subjects by claiming that he 
did not have any; for example, he did not want to comment on Roe.86  Angered 
by what they regarded as dissembling, the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee retaliated by bringing forth a surprise witness—Anita Hill—who 
accused Thomas of engaging in inappropriate sexual advances when she was 
his subordinate at the EEOC.87  Thomas made a blanket denial of the charges 
and accused the accusers of trying to engage in a “high-tech lynching for 
uppity-blacks.”88  After opinion polls showed that slightly more viewers of this 
televised spectacle believed Thomas than Hill, he was confirmed by a vote of 
52-48, the narrowest margin of confirmation in Supreme Court history. 
The searing confirmation experience reportedly left Thomas deeply 
embittered,89 and seems to have steeled his resolve to embrace only the most 
outspoken conservative views as a kind of revenge against his tormentors.  
Thus, for example, it has been reported that Thomas surrounds himself with 
 
 84. See generally JOHN GREENYA, SILENT JUSTICE: THE CLARENCE THOMAS STORY 
(2001). 
 85. See EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 449-50 (1998). 
 86. 1 The Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 
127 (1991) [hereinafter Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas]. 
 87. GREENYA, supra note 84, at 200. 
 88. See 4 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas, supra note 86, at 157. 
 89. ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 469-70 (2001). 
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“uniformly archconservative clerks”90 whom he encourages to draft opinions 
“remarkably provocative in result.”91 
Whatever the truth of these accounts, Thomas’s opinions have been 
consistently distinguished by a kind of ultra quality since joining the Court.  
His most revealing statements appear in concurring and dissenting opinions, 
where he has embraced a variety of viewpoints—at times libertarian, at times 
originalist, at times federalist—but always at the far right end of the judicial 
spectrum.  Thus, Thomas has authored several separate opinions which come 
closer to endorsing a purely originalist philosophy for interpreting the 
Constitution than has any other Justice in the Court’s long history.92  He has 
decried the continued use of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine on the 
ground that it has no basis in constitutional text and unduly interferes with the 
states.93  He has developed a compact theory of federalism based on the idea 
that the Constitution was ratified by the states as opposed to the people.94  
Moreover, he has adopted narrow interpretations of federal statutes in order to 
preserve traditional state prerogatives.95 
We also have more direct evidence of the differing preferences of Justices 
White and Thomas.  These two men served together on the Court for most of 
two Terms.  Consequently, we can look at their voting records during these 
two Terms for clues about how they compare in their response to a range of 
issues.  Overall, we find that White and Thomas voted together in about 67% 
of the cases decided in these two Terms.96  This is significantly higher than the 
rate of agreement between Thomas and either Justice Stevens or Justice 
Blackmun,97 but it is significantly lower than the rate of agreement between 
 
 90. LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 457. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(urging return to original understanding of the Commerce Clause); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
521 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of adopting interpretation of the Privilege 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contrary to the original understanding); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging return to 
original understanding of the Commerce Clause); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) 
(Thomas, J.) (opinion for the Court holding that common law knock-and-announce rule was 
incorporated into the Fourth Amendment). 
 93. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 94. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 95. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 402 (1999) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting in part) (urging narrow interpretation of Telecommunications Act of 1996 in order to 
preserve traditional state authority over regulation of intrastate telephone service). 
 96. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 379 tbl.I(B) 
(1992); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 373 tbl.I(B) 
(1993). 
 97. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 96 (approximate rates of 
agreement for Thomas and Stevens equal 41% (1991) and for Thomas and Blackmun equal 42% 
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Thomas and either Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Scalia.98  Thus, based on 
his first two Terms on the Court, Thomas would appear to be aligned much 
more closely with the conservative jurisprudence of Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia than with the type of conservatism associated with Justice 
White. 
When we take a closer look at the cases in which White and Thomas 
disagreed during those two Terms, we find further confirmation that they are 
conservatives of a different stripe.  For example, one can detect differing 
attitudes toward federal regulation of economic activity in Lechmere, Inc. v. 
NLRB.99  Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court, overturning a Labor 
Board ruling about when union organizers who are not members of the 
workforce can enter an employer’s private property.  Justice White, dissenting, 
would have deferred to the Board’s ruling.  CSX Transportation, Inc. v. 
Easterwood100 suggests differing attitudes toward federal preemption of state 
law.  This time Justice White wrote for the Court, finding that a train operated 
within speed limits set by a Department of Transportation regulation is 
immune from state-law tort suits predicated on negligence.  Justice Thomas 
dissented in part, arguing that the federal rule was a regulatory floor, not a 
source of immunity from state tort liability.  Furthermore, Helling v. 
McKinney101 reveals different attitudes toward sources of constitutional 
interpretation.  Writing for the Court, Justice White concluded that the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not foreclose a claim by a prisoner that 
being forced to share a cell with a chain smoker is cruel and unusual 
punishment. Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the Eighth 
Amendment as originally understood applied only to the terms of punishments 
imposed at sentencing, not to conditions of confinement that arise while a 
sentence is being carried out.  Thus, in his view (joined only by Justice Scalia), 
the prisoner’s claim was not covered by the Eighth Amendment at all.  
Given their distinctive judicial philosophies, one would expect to find 
significant areas of overlap in the substantive positions of Justices White and 
Thomas, but also areas where they would take sharply divergent positions.  
The areas where one would expect to find overlap include most of what I have 
 
(1991)); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 96 (approximate rates of 
agreement for Thomas and Stevens equal 46% (1992) and for Thomas and Blackmun equal 51% 
(1992)). 
 98. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 96 (approximate rates of 
agreement for Thomas and Rehnquist equal 80% (1991) and for Thomas and Scalia equal 86% 
(1991)); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 96 (approximate rates of 
agreement for Thomas and Rehnquist equal 83% (1992) and for Thomas and Scalia equal 86% 
(1992)). 
 99. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
 100. 507 U.S. 658 (1993). 
 101. 509 U.S. 25 (1993). 
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previously identified as the “social issues” basket: abortion, other privacy 
rights, affirmative action, and religious accommodation.  Although White and 
Thomas might reach these results for different reasons, they would generally 
end up at the same place.  With respect to social issues, therefore, the Thomas-
for-White switch would not be expected to induce any change in the overall 
doctrine of the Rehnquist Court. 
There are, however, at least three areas where the preferences of Justices 
White and Thomas diverge fairly sharply and, hence, where the attitudinal 
theory would lead us to expect a potential shift in outcomes.  Probably the 
most dramatic divergence is constitutional federalism, where Justice White’s 
strong nationalism and deference to Congress contrasts sharply with Justice 
Thomas’s originalism and commitment to state autonomy.  Here, there is no 
doubt that the White-to-Thomas transfer has had major consequences.  Most of 
the Court’s innovations in the area of federalism since 1993 have been decided 
by a margin of 5-4.  In nearly all these cases, Justice Thomas has supplied the 
critical fifth vote.102  Nor can there be much doubt that if Justice White had 
remained on the Court, he would have disavowed these innovations.  With 
respect to claims grounded in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments we can be 
quite confident about this.  Justice White dissented from the Tenth Amendment 
portion of the Court’s 1992 decision in New York v. United States.103  Thus, it 
seems likely that if White were still on the Court in 1997, the background 
check requirement of the gun control law known as the Brady Bill would have 
been upheld in Printz v. United States,104 rather than invalidated 5-4.  With 
respect to the Eleventh Amendment, White authored a separate opinion in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.105 in 1989, creating a 5-4 majority for the 
proposition that Congress has the power, under Article I of the Constitution, to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.106  After 
 
 102. Justice Thomas has supplied the fifth vote in thirteen major 5-4 federalism decisions: 
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Raygor v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 
(2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses. Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Printz 
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 103. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 104. Printz, 521 U.S. at 898. 
 105. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 106. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I agree with the 
conclusion reached by Justice Brennan in Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority 
under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not 
agree with much of his reasoning.”). 
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White retired, the Court in Seminole Tribe,107 overruled Union Gas and held 5-
4 that Congress does not have power under Article I to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity. 
A second area of potentially significant contrast is the First Amendment.  
Justice White was highly skeptical about claims for novel forms of protection 
under the Free Speech and Press Clauses of the Constitution.  He authored a 
number of important opinions rejecting claims of special privileges for the 
press and construing important First Amendment doctrines narrowly.108  
Justice Thomas, in contrast, has often embraced a libertarian view of the First 
Amendment and, in select areas, has advocated greater protection for free 
speech rights than is recognized under current doctrine.109 
Although we can identify individual First Amendment cases where the 
replacement of Justice White by Justice Thomas may have affected the 
outcomes reached by the Court, 110 they are few in number relative to the total 
number of First Amendment cases decided by the Court since 1994.  In most 
First Amendment cases, Justice Thomas’s vote either has not been critical in 
making a majority or has been cast in dissent.  There are various reasons for 
this.  In some areas, such as commercial speech, enthusiasm for the pro-speech 
position often includes Justices on both sides of the ideological divide, 
resulting in decisions by margins larger than 5-4.111  In other areas, such as 
providing constitutional protection for campaign finance contributions or for 
anti-abortion demonstrators, either Justice O’Connor or Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, or both, has bailed out from the pro-speech position, leaving 
 
 107. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. 44. 
 108. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (White, J.); Herbert 
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (White, J.); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) 
(White, J.); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (White, J.). 
 109. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1509 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (reiterating his view that the Central Hudson test for evaluating commercial speech 
restrictions should be abandoned in favor of granting full protection to commercial speech unless 
it promotes an illegal product or is false); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412 
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that campaign contributions are entitled to full First 
Amendment protection); cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (Thomas, J., plurality 
opinion) (refusing to invalidate federal regulations designed to restrict access of juveniles to 
sexually explicit speech on the internet). 
 110. See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (invalidating 5-4 a Minnesota 
rule prohibiting candidates for elected judicial offices from commenting on issues related to 
controversies likely to come before the court); Thompson, 122 S. Ct. 1497 (striking down 5-4 a 
federal statute prohibiting advertising by individual pharmacies that compound drugs in a manner 
not determined by the FDA to be safe and effective); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000) (overturning 5-4 as an infringement on First Amendment freedom of expressive 
association a New Jersey decision extending a state antidiscrimination law to an openly gay Scout 
leader). 
 111. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
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Thomas in the minority.112  Probably the most important reason, however, is 
that Justice Thomas’s libertarian view of the First Amendment is highly 
selective.  He believes in strong, virtually absolute, protection for commercial 
speech and campaign finance contributions,113 but he is willing to accept 
extensive government regulation of sexually explicit speech, legal advocacy 
for the poor, and subsidies of the arts.114  Thus, at least part of the time—when 
the speech claim involves disfavored forms of expression—his views do not 
diverge from those of the general First Amendment skeptic, Justice White. 
Separation of powers is another area where the transition from White to 
Thomas could, in theory, make a difference.  Justice White was notorious for 
his defense of functionalism and deference to congressional experimentation in 
separation of powers cases.115  Thomas appears to be drawn to a more 
formalist and originalist approach to separation of powers issues.116  Here, 
however, we find no case in which Justice Thomas has cast a critical vote 
producing an outcome that would diverge from those that would be reached if 
Justice White were still around.  The simple explanation seems to be that, 
although the appointment of Justice Thomas gave Justice Scalia a second vote 
in support of a strict, formalist approach to separation-of-powers controversies, 
this increased the number of Justices committed to such an approach from one 
to two.  The lack of any broad-scale support for formalism can be seen most 
clearly in cases involving standing-to-sue, the most frequently litigated 
separation of powers question.  Although Justice Scalia made some headway in 
support of tightening constitutional limits on standing late in the first 
Rehnquist Court, it appears, in retrospect, that this was largely a temporary 
phenomenon created by the Chief Justice’s willingness to assign opinions to 
 
 112. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (O’Connor, 
J., joining Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., to uphold limitation on coordinated campaign 
spending); Nixon, 528 U.S. 377 (Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, Souter, & 
Breyer, JJ.); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, 
& Breyer, JJ., join Stevens, J., in upholding speech restriction on abortion clinic protestors). 
 113. See cases cited supra note 109. 
 114. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 564 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting facial attack 
on Child Online Protection Act); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) 
(Thomas, J., joining dissent from judgment striking down limits on types of litigation that can be 
undertaken pursuant to Legal Services grants); NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590 (1998) 
(Thomas, J., joining Scalia concurrence denying that First Amendment provides a basis for 
challenging criteria for distributing arts grants). 
 115. See cases cited supra note 78. 
 116. The clearest manifestation of Justice Thomas’s commitment to formalism in separation 
of power is Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), where he 
joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court rejecting a nondelegation challenge to the Clean Air 
Act, but filed a concurring opinion suggesting that he might vote otherwise in a future challenge 
to such a statute that argued more broadly that Congress had impermissibly transferred the 
“legislative power” to an agency. 
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Justice Scalia in this area at that time.117  More recently, standing rules have 
been relaxed again as the conservative majority has narrowed and assignments 
have been passed around to other Justices, often with Scalia and Thomas in 
dissent.118 
All-in-all, the attitudinal model, and more particularly the substitution of 
Thomas for White, does a good job in explaining one critical difference 
between the first and second Rehnquist Courts: it changed the balance of 
power on the Court on federalism issues, tipping from 5-4 in support of the 
traditional New Deal conception to 5-4 in support of a revisionist, states’ rights 
conception.  Thus, the attitudinal model can explain, in a parsimonious and 
convincing fashion, the signature jurisprudential development of the last eight 
years. 
When we consider the matter more closely, however, it becomes clear that 
the attitudinal model only gets us so far.  In particular, it accounts for only one 
of the five votes in the post-1994 federalism coalition.  Moreover, because 
both Justices White and Thomas cast conservative votes in cases presenting 
social issues, it does not account for the decline in emphasis on social issues.  
Nor does it explain the paucity of doctrinal innovations in cases involving 
social issues during the first Rehnquist Court, in contrast to the stream of 
substantive innovations on federalism during the second Rehnquist Court.  Nor 
can the model account for the collapse in the size of the Court’s docket, the 
increased willingness to render controversial rulings by 5-4 margins, or the 
reduced number of plurality decisions.  If we want an explanation for these 
other elements that distinguish the second Rehnquist Court from the first, we 
will have to turn to other hypotheses about judicial behavior. 
IV.  THE INTERNAL STRATEGIC ACTOR MODEL: JUSTICE SCALIA AND STATES’ 
RIGHTS 
In recent years, political scientists have been intrigued by the idea of 
displacing, or at least supplementing, the simple attitudinal model with more 
complex models that hypothesize that judges act strategically.  Like the 
attitudinal model, these strategic models begin by positing that Justices seek to 
maximize their personal policy preferences.  Unlike the attitudinal model, 
however, the strategic models do not assume that judges vote reflexively in 
each case for the outcome that corresponds most closely with their preferences.  
Instead, they act interdependently, taking into account the views of other actors 
whose behavior is relevant to whether they will succeed in implementing their 
 
 117. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Scalia, J.); Lujan v. Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (Scalia, J.). 
 118. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198 
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.); Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 403 
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.). 
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preferences. As Epstein and Knight put it, “To say that a justice acts 
strategically is to say that she realizes that her success or failure depends on the 
preferences of other actors and the actions she expects them to take, not just on 
her own preferences and actions.”119 
Broadly speaking, political scientists have identified two types of reasons 
why Justices might act strategically.120  One reason is that it takes a majority of 
sitting Justices to enshrine a particular position as precedent.  Justices will thus 
sometimes adopt positions that do not reflect their sincere judgment of the best 
outcome in order to secure the outcome that is in their view the best that can be 
attained under the circumstances, given the positions of the other Justices.  I 
will call the model of judicial behavior that focuses on this type of strategic 
consideration the “internal strategic actor” model.  Another reason why judges 
might behave strategically is because of apprehensions about how other 
political institutions—such as Congress, the executive, or the states—might 
react to their decision, or how the public might react.  I will call this model of 
judging the “external strategic actor” model and take up its implications in Part 
V. 
Strategic behavior is not necessarily insincere behavior.  For example, it 
may happen that what a judge sincerely wants is what the judge perceives other 
relevant actors also want.  In this situation, there is no incompatibility between 
a judge acting on his or her sincere preferences and behaving strategically.121  
Political scientists, however, have argued that judges also act strategically in 
the sense that they act “insincerely” in order to realize their preferences.122  In 
other words, judges sometimes censure the impulse to embrace the outcome 
they prefer most and, instead, support outcomes they regard as less desirable or 
second best because of their perceptions of the values embraced by other actors 
who have the power to block the realization of the judge’s first preference. 
The line between sincere and insincere judicial behavior is often hard to 
determine, especially if we continue to follow the suggestion set forth in Part 
III that we broaden the definition of judicial “preferences” to include judicial 
philosophy.  Multi-member courts, by their very nature, require judges to 
temper or compromise their individual preferences in order to produce 
majority rulings.  As Justice Frankfurter once observed, “When you have to 
have at least five people to agree on something, they can’t have that 
comprehensive completeness of candor which is open to a single man, giving 
 
 119. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 12. 
 120. See id. at 12-17. 
 121. See Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An 
Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 397 n.8 (2002); see also Caldeira et al., supra 
note 74, at 550-51. 
 122. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2302 (1999). 
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his own reasons untrammeled by what anybody else may do or not do . . . .”123  
It is not clear that this kind of temporizing of views to achieve collegial unity 
should be called insincere behavior because it is not clear that it reflects a 
deliberate suppression of a judge’s true preferences.  Surely one of the 
“preferences” held by judges sitting on a collegial court is the desire that the 
court produce majority rulings.  Thus, when a collegial judge trims back on the 
“untrammeled” views he or she would espouse if sitting as a single judge, one 
can say that the judge simply is weighing the sincere desire for clear majority 
rulings more highly than the sincere desire to prevail on the issue at hand, with 
the result that the temporizing behavior is totally sincere.124  Once we 
recognize this complexity, however, the line between sincere temporizing to 
achieve “collegial unity” and insincere dissembling to manipulate outcomes is 
often difficult to identify, especially for outside observers.  I will return to this 
problem in the conclusion to this Part. 
An example of insincere strategic behavior, which has taken on a kind of 
canonical status in the literature, is Lee Epstein and Jack Knight’s account of 
Craig v. Boren,125 a leading gender discrimination precedent of the Burger 
Court.  By examining the docket sheets and memorandums in the case, as 
reflected in the files of several former Justices, Epstein and Knight concluded 
that the Court was essentially divided into three factions: first, a liberal faction, 
led by Justice Brennan, that preferred to adopt a rule that would subject gender 
discrimination to a standard of strict scrutiny; second, a moderate faction, led 
by Justice Powell, that preferred a standard of intermediate scrutiny; and third, 
a conservative faction, led by Justice Rehnquist, that preferred a rational basis 
standard of scrutiny.  Epstein and Knight showed that Justice Brennan, who 
assigned the case to himself as the senior Justice in the majority, decided to 
draft an opinion that endorsed intermediate scrutiny, his second preference, 
rather than strict scrutiny, his first preference.  They suggested that he did so 
because he calculated that if he wrote an opinion urging strict scrutiny, the 
result might have been that five Justices would have joined another opinion 
applying rational basis scrutiny, his least preferred outcome.126  Thus, 
Brennan’s opinion did not reflect a mere desire to achieve collegial unity; 
rather, it was designed to forestall an outcome that he feared and wished to 
avoid. 
 
 123. FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 298 (1960). 
 124. In other words, in looking for insincere behavior in a judge what we are looking for is 
“behavior that transgresses both her own convictions per se, and her convictions as appropriately 
modified to respond to the pressures of collegial unity and sound collegial outcome.”  Lewis A. 
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 53 (1993). 
 125. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 126. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 13. 
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In this section, I consider the possibility that the reorientation of the 
Rehnquist Court in the mid-1990s can be explained by strategic behavior of the 
internal actor variety.  To date, accounts of strategic behavior of the internal 
actor variety have largely focused on the behavior of an individual Justice in a 
single case, such as Justice Brennan’s strategizing in Craig v. Boren.  The 
hypothesis I consider also focuses on a single individual—Justice Scalia—but 
posits strategic behavior on a scale that dwarfs anything considered by political 
scientists up to this point.  I will suggest that Justice Scalia has behaved 
strategically in seeking to influence the entire course of the Rehnquist Court 
over the last eight years. 
A. Scalia’s Choice 
When Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986, he had an extraordinarily 
ambitious agenda that was in part substantive and in part methodological.  In 
terms of substantive outcomes, he wanted to overturn Roe v. Wade,127 end 
affirmative action, develop a new policy of public accommodation toward 
religion, establish the principle of the unitary executive in separation of 
powers, and strengthen constitutional protection for private property.  
However, his agenda was also, to a degree very unusual among Justices, 
methodological.  He wanted to create a jurisprudence that was grounded in the 
public meaning of texts rather than legislative intent, which would require 
judges systematically to accept executive interpretations of ambiguous statutes, 
and which would be oriented toward the articulation of clear rules rather than 
multi-prong lists of factors or balancing tests.128  One item that notably was not 
on the agenda, however, was greater devolution of power to the states. 
During the first Rehnquist Court, Justice Scalia had every reason to persist 
in vigorously pursuing both his substantive and methodological agendas.  
Indeed, after only a few years, he began to achieve a significant degree of 
success in moving the Court toward his methodological views.  Although there 
was no definitive capitulation by the other Justices, opinions for the Supreme 
Court—and, to a degree by emulation, opinions by courts throughout the 
country—began to reduce their reliance on legislative history, to take agency 
views more seriously, and to eschew the creation of new formulaic multipart 
tests.  Progress on the substantive front, however, proved more elusive.  The 
Court always seemed to fall one vote short of overturning precedents like Roe 
 
 127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 128. We know all of this because he has published books and articles espousing each of these 
positions.  See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) (attacking the use of 
legislative history in the interpretation of statutes); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989) (defending mandatory judicial 
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (advocating a jurisprudence of rules). 
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and Lemon v. Kurtzman.129  Moreover, Justice Scalia’s views on affirmative 
action received a severe blow in Metro Broadcasting,130 as did his views on 
separation of powers in Morrison v. Olson.131 
As the new decade of the 1990s dawned, however, there was reason to 
believe that the tide would soon turn.  Indeed, for roughly a three-year period 
toward the end of the first Rehnquist Court—from October 1990 to the 
summer of 1993—the conservatives reasonably could imagine that they were 
on the threshold of supermajority status within the Court.  Brennan’s 
replacement by Souter in the summer of 1990 theoretically gave the 
conservatives a 6-3 margin.  We now know that this was illusory because 
Souter either was, or decided to become, a member of the liberal faction; 
however, the other conservative Justices might well have imagined they were 
more powerful than they had been in 1986.  In 1991, this became a reality, as 
Thurgood Marshall stepped down and was replaced by Clarence Thomas.  
Thomas soon proved to be a staunch conservative.  For roughly a two year 
period thereafter—from October 1991 to the summer of 1993—the 
conservatives really did enjoy a 6-3 margin on the Court. 
The fact that the conservatives either were or imagined that they were 
becoming an increasingly dominant faction would have been an extremely 
important datum for an internally-oriented strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s 
position, and it would have led such a Justice to anticipate that success in 
achieving his ends was just around the corner.  This sense of expectation for 
the future is arguably captured by a line in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion 
in a 1990 abortion case: “The Court should end its disruptive intrusion into this 
field as soon as possible.”132 
By 1993, however, Justice Scalia’s substantive agenda lay in shambles.  
The basic problem was the unwillingness of three Republican appointees—
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter—to disrupt the constitutional status 
quo.  Most dramatically, these three had colluded together in 1992 to produce 
the reaffirmation of the “essential holding” of Roe in Casey,133 citing concerns 
about stare decisis and the Court’s legitimacy.134  With White’s departure in 
1993, the prospect for eliminating Roe and other manifestations of modern 
substantive due process were gone for the indefinite future.  Similarly, the 
cause of religious accommodation had been dealt a severe blow by Lee v. 
 
 129. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 130. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding minority preference policies 
in awarding broadcasting licenses). 
 131. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the Independent Counsel Act against separation of 
powers objections). 
 132. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 521 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
 133. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 134. On the secretiveness of the Casey trio, see LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 472. 
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Weisman,135 decided the same term as Casey.  There, the same three 
Republican appointees who defected in Casey reaffirmed the rule against 
prayer in public school settings; worse, after previously having made 
sympathetic noises, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor got cold feet and 
appeared to disavow Justice Scalia’s drive to overturn Lemon.136  With respect 
to affirmative action and other issues involving race, such as redistricting and 
busing, the situation was less dire, but Justice Souter was likely to side with the 
liberals on these issues, and Justice O’Connor had signaled her unwillingness 
to adopt a clear rule prohibiting preferential racial classifications.137  So the 
best that probably could be achieved going forward was endless hairsplitting 
distinctions in plurality decisions.  Separation of powers was the most 
distressing of all.  Here, Justice Scalia had become completely isolated in cases 
like Morrison138 and Mistretta.139  To cap it all off, a Democratic President was 
newly installed in the White House, and, thus, there was no prospect for the 
foreseeable future of gaining ground in any of these areas through new 
appointments to the Court. 
In this situation, a strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s position would have 
perceived essentially two choices.  One was to persist in the substantive agenda 
he had been seeking since his appointment to the Court and become, in effect, 
a chronic dissenter.  The other was quietly to abandon, or at least shelve, this 
substantive agenda, and seek out some other agenda as to which he could find 
common ground with four other Justices.  A rational actor seeking to maximize 
his policy preferences would have perceived a number of advantages to 
pursuing the latter, that is, the strategic, course. 
1. Influencing majority opinions.  It is always better to be part of a winning 
coalition than to lose.  Being a member of a winning coalition creates 
opportunities to frame legal doctrine that disappear when one loses.  In Justice 
Scalia’s case, this consideration should loom especially large given his 
strongly held methodological preferences.  If part of the majority, for instance, 
Justice Scalia could continue to work to extirpate balancing tests from 
constitutional law, either by writing majority opinions that disavow such an 
approach or by asking that such tests be eliminated as a condition of joining 
other majority opinions.  Moreover, if and when he was assigned periodically 
 
 135. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 136. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 137. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality); 
cf. id. at 735-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 138. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the Independent Counsel Act against 
separation of powers objections); id. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 139. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding delegation of power to U.S. 
Sentencing Commission to adopt binding guidelines for maximum and minimum federal criminal 
sentences); id. at 413-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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to write majority opinions, he could use the occasion to plant seeds for future 
developments in other areas he regards as being more important. 
2. Potential reciprocity.  Providing a key vote to make a majority for other 
Justices could potentially yield future benefits in terms of reciprocity.  It is 
often observed—correctly—that logrolling is prohibited under the decisional 
norms of the Supreme Court,140 but it is impossible to erase considerations of 
good will entirely from human behavior.  If someone with whom you interact 
frequently does a number of favors for you, the expectation is that these favors 
will, in some fashion, be returned.  If Justice Scalia had learned anything from 
the abortion cases, it should have been that trying to browbeat other Justices 
through invective and sarcasm does not work.  Perhaps cooperating politely as 
part of a functioning majority on issues of lower public visibility would lead to 
better relations, in particular with Justice O’Connor, which might bear fruit 
down the road if she were willing to reciprocate. 
3. Please the Chief.  Cooperating with the other four conservatives could 
win brownie points with the Chief Justice.  There is evidence that the Chief 
Justice did not always favor Justice Scalia with the best opinion writing 
assignments during the first Rehnquist Court.141  There are a number of 
possible reasons for this, one of them, no doubt, being that Scalia’s persistent 
efforts to enshrine his methodological preferences in the law often ended up 
costing him votes, sometimes even majority support.  The Chief Justice was 
probably baffled by Justice Scalia’s strongly-held methodological 
commitments, and often irritated by his verbal pyrotechnics and the hard 
feelings they engendered with other Justices.  Adopting a policy of quietly 
joining the other conservatives to form a majority in other areas—especially 
ones near and dear to the Chief’s heart—might induce Rehnquist to look more 
kindly upon Scalia when opinion assignments came up in other areas where he 
cared more deeply about the outcome. 
4. The legacy.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly for an ambitious 
Justice like Scalia, it is important to be able to say that one’s tenure on the 
Court has made a difference in the course of history.  By 1993, it appeared that 
persevering in his original substantive agenda might produce a lot of sound and 
fury signifying nothing.  Better to leave some kind of legacy than none at all. 
Suppose, to continue to spell out the hypothesis, that Justice Scalia had 
engaged in the foregoing reasoning process or something like it in the mid-
1990s, and, to reverse the old jingle, that he concluded it is “better to switch 
 
 140. See Caminker, supra note 122, at 2333. 
 141. See Albert P. Melone & Thea F. Rubin, Justice Antonin Scalia: A First Year Freshman 
Effect?, 72 JUDICATURE 98, 99-100 (1988) (reporting that Scalia’s Majority Opinion Assignment 
Ratio (OAR) was the lowest of any member of the court in the 1986 term despite a plethora of 
concurring and dissenting opinions); Sue Davis, Power on the Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
Opinion Assignments, 74 JUDICATURE 66, 70 (1990) (calculating that Scalia’s 12.12 OAR in 
“important cases” falls well below those of White and Powell). 
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than to fight.”  What course of conduct would he have pursued?  The obvious 
strategy would have had two sides: an affirmative side and a negative side. 
On the affirmative side, a strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s position would 
have sought to identify areas of potential agreement among the five remaining 
conservatives.  Constitutional federalism would seem to be a prime candidate.  
Justice O’Connor, born and raised in Arizona and a former state legislator, had 
signaled repeatedly that she cares deeply about such issues.142  Justice 
Kennedy, another westerner who was the son of a state lobbyist and a former 
state lobbyist himself, also seemed committed to states’ rights.143  The Chief 
Justice’s support was a foregone conclusion.144  Justice Thomas, lastly, 
appeared willing to support any conservative position that was anathema to the 
Democratic left.  Other possibilities for cooperation included racial preferences 
other than affirmative action programs (such as the creation of majority-
minority districts in voting rights cases), cases involving viewpoint-neutral 
subsidies that include religious schools and organizations, and the Takings 
Clause.  Having identified these areas of potential agreement, the strategic 
Justice would work to identify and vote to hear cases presenting issues as to 
which the conservative coalition would likely hang together.  He would then 
signal through repeated behavior a willingness to join without qualification any 
majority opinion in these areas supported by the other four conservatives.  This 
would embolden the others to take on important cases in these areas and reach 
results that would push the envelope in a conservative direction.  It would also 
stake out a claim for reciprocal treatment by other members of the coalition, 
including perhaps on other issues, and more favorable opinion assignments 
from the Chief. 
On the negative side, a strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s position would 
vote to deny certiorari and work to convince others to deny certiorari in cases 
presenting issues in which the conservative coalition would be likely to fall 
apart.  This would include abortion, affirmative action, government speech on 
religious topics, and many separation of powers issues. 
If someone in Justice Scalia’s position had adopted such a strategic plan in 
1994, the result would have been a sharp break in the character of the 
Rehnquist Court, and that break would have corresponded fairly closely to the 
changes outlined in Part II: The Court’s agenda would have turned away from 
 
 142. See SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & H. ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A CATTLE 
RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (2002).  For examples of Justice O’Connor’s 
commitment to federalism, see, for example, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 143. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). 
 144. All commentators agree that Chief Justice Rehnquist has been steadfastly committed 
since his days as an Associate Justice to achieving a reduction of federal power and an 
enhancement of states’ rights.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, 
and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 623 (1994) (and sources cited therein). 
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social issues toward constitutional federalism; shifting coalitions would have 
been replaced by a persistent 5-4 split with the conservatives in the majority, 
and the Court would begin to reach significant doctrinal innovations in its new 
areas of concentration. 
The fact that one can hypothesize a the strategy that a rational actor in 
Justice Scalia’s position might have adopted in mid-1990s that “fits” the facts 
as they have unfolded since that time must be counted as at least some 
evidence that the hypothesized strategy was in fact adopted.  However, it is 
hardly conclusive evidence.  Some day, when the Justices’ papers for the 
period in question become available, scholars may be able to uncover direct 
evidence that either confirms or disconfirms the hypothesis of strategic 
behavior by Justice Scalia.  Unfortunately, one consequence of a Court with no 
retirements is that no papers have become available for this period.  For now, 
we have to content ourselves with circumstantial evidence that either tends to 
confirm or refute the hypothesis.  That evidence is mixed.  In order to keep the 
discussion within manageable bounds, I will confine myself to the 
circumstantial evidence about Justice Scalia’s position on questions of 
constitutional federalism. 
B. Circumstantial Evidence Supporting the Strategic Hypothesis 
There are a number of reasons to believe that when Justice Scalia joined 
the Court in 1986 he could not be described as an advocate of states’ rights or a 
general proponent of devolution of power from the federal government to the 
states.  Nothing in his background would suggest such an orientation.  In 
contrast to the other four members of today’s conservative coalition, Scalia had 
never worked in state government, nor had he been active in state or local 
politics.145  His entire professional career had been in federal service or in 
teaching federal administrative law at national law schools.146  His three and 
one-half years on the D.C. Circuit did nothing to deflect this orientation since 
that court deals primarily with questions of federal law, and especially federal 
administrative regulation. 
Given this background, it is not surprising that Scalia had little occasion to 
consider questions of constitutional federalism before he was appointed to the 
Supreme Court.  He did address the question of federal sovereign immunity, 
writing early in his academic career one of the leading articles on this arcane 
subject before it was largely rendered moot by amendments to the 
 
 145. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 292 (2d ed. 1996). 
 146. For a full chronological account of Scalia’s pre-judicial career and writings, see 
RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 16-32 
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Administrative Procedure Act.147  This article and other remarks on the 
subject148 indicate that Justice Scalia recognized that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity has little claim either to historical legitimacy or practical efficacy.  
Someone harboring these views about federal sovereign immunity would be 
unlikely to give an unqualified endorsement to state sovereign immunity; 
certainly he or she would be unlikely to press for an expansion of such 
immunity, such as we have seen in recent years. 
With respect to the more general topic of federalism, Justice Scalia’s pre-
judicial attitude is best captured in a short essay entitled The Two Faces of 
Federalism, based on a speech he gave at the first National Symposium of the 
Federalist Society, held at the Yale Law School in April 1982.149  In this 
speech, Scalia criticized conservatives for their “unthinking extension” of 
notions of natural autonomy from individuals to state governments.  The 
decision as to which level of government ought to decide any particular matter 
should be “a pragmatic one,” he argued, not one driven by a “generalized 
hostility towards national law which has become a common feature of 
conservative thought.”150  Scalia warned against a tendency on the part of 
conservatives to content themselves with having the federal government do 
nothing and urged instead that they actively seek out areas where federal 
preemption of state law and policy would promote “a policy of market 
freedom.”151  As examples, he cited federal preemption of municipal franchise 
restrictions on cable television systems and federal preemption of local rent 
control laws.  He concluded: “I urge you, then—as Hamilton would have urged 
you—to keep in mind that the federal government is not bad but good.  The 
trick is to use it wisely.”152 
This evidence from the period before his nomination is confirmed by 
Justice Scalia’s behavior once he assumed his position on the Court.  In his 
first year, in a preview of things to come, the eight more senior Justices 
engaged in a skirmish over the Eleventh Amendment in Welch v. Texas 
Department of Highways.153  Justice Brennan, on behalf of four Justices, urged 
the overruling of the venerable decision in Hans v. Louisiana,154 which had 
extended the Eleventh Amendment beyond its narrow text (which mentions 
 
 147. Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970). 
 148. See Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, in SUPREME COURT 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, YEARBOOK 1985, at 103, 104, quoted in Erwin Chemerinsky, Against 
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 149. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19 (1982). 
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 151. Id. at 21. 
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 153. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). 
 154. Id. at 478. 
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only suits by noncitizens) to include suits by citizens based on the presence of 
a federal question.155  Justice Powell, writing for four other Justices, defended 
Hans, primarily on grounds of stare decisis.  The Court’s junior Justice 
declined to take sides in the dispute, noting that the issue had barely been 
mentioned in the briefs and at oral argument.  He said: 
I find both the correctness of Hans as an original matter, and the feasibility, if 
it was wrong, of correcting it without distorting what we have done in tacit 
reliance upon it, complex enough questions that I am unwilling to address them 
in a case whose presentation focused on other matters.156 
As his brief concurring opinion in Welch makes clear, Justice Scalia was at this 
time genuinely dubitante on the issue.  He seemed to regard Hans as 
presumptively unsound, given its deviation from constitutional text and its 
perpetuation of an outmoded doctrine.  The issue was how to strike a balance 
between the infirmities of the decision and the claims of stare decisis.  (Three 
years later, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,157 Justice Scalia resolved his 
doubts in favor of reaffirming Hans as a matter of stare decisis.) 
A further piece of circumstantial evidence tending to suggest the strategic 
nature of Justice Scalia’s behavior on constitutional federalism is his voting 
record in preemption cases.  A true believer in states’ rights presumably would 
want to see greater power devolve from the federal government to the states.  
Such a sincere federalist would not only support formal limits on congressional 
power and immunities for states from suits by private citizens grounded in 
federal law, but he or she would also want to interpret the preemptive effect of 
federal statutes narrowly, so as to leave as large an ambit of state regulatory 
authority as possible.158  Yet Justice Scalia has been and remains one of the 
most consistent supporters of broad interpretations of the preemptive scope of 
federal law.  Examples of this tendency on his part are legion; I list in the 
footnote only some of those cases where Justice Scalia has supported federal 
preemption, but either Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Thomas (both of 
 
 155. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 156. Welch, 483 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 157. 491 U.S. 1, 29-45 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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whom are more consistent supporters of states’ rights) have voted against a 
finding of preemption.159 
Moving forward to the period after 1993, we find other contextual 
evidence that Justice Scalia’s behavior in the constitutional federalism cases is 
strategic.  One piece of evidence—reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes’s dog that 
did not bark—is the absence of any separate concurring opinions by Justice 
Scalia in the Court’s post-Lopez federalism decisions.160  Justice Scalia has 
written in only three of these cases, each time presumably pursuant to an 
assignment by Chief Justice Rehnquist to write the opinion for the Court.  In 
sharp contrast to the other members of the federalism five, he has chosen not to 
offer any additional thoughts or clarifications of his own views in concurring 
opinions.161  Since one does not see similar self-restraint by Justice Scalia in 
other contexts where he clearly cares about the issue,162 this suggests that he 
remains, at best, uninterested in issues of constitutional federalism. 
Closely related to the absence of separate opinions is the glaring 
contradiction in many recent cases between the majority’s mode of analysis 
and some of Justice Scalia’s most fervently held substantive and 
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methodological convictions.  As the Court’s federalism rulings have grown 
bolder, some of its decisions have reached substantive judgments with which 
Justice Scalia must be uncomfortable.  Especially striking in this regard is 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank,163 which held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a private action against 
the state for patent infringement.  The holding effectively denies individual 
patent owners any means of vindication for an important type of property right 
when it is taken by a state.164  For the Court’s most consistent defender of 
property rights, joining this decision must have entailed some hard swallowing. 
Even more pronounced is the tension between the new federalism and 
Justice Scalia’s methodological convictions.  Both the Tenth Amendment’s 
anti-commandeering principle and the extension of the Eleventh Amendment 
to include actions in state court and before federal administrative agencies lack 
any foundation in the text of the Constitution.165  In other contexts, such as 
substantive due process and the dormant Commerce Clause, Justice Scalia has 
been scornful of judicial doctrines that have no perceived foundation in the 
constitutional text.166  Similarly, in both its Commerce Clause decisions (for 
example, Lopez167 and Morrison168) and its Section 5 decisions (for example, 
Florida Prepaid,169 Kimel,170 and Garrett171) the Rehnquist majority has 
engaged in a close analysis of whether Congress has made sufficient “findings” 
to justify its exercise of legislative power under these grants of authority.  This 
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process-based review entails an extensive foray into legislative history and 
would seem to implicate all of the dangers of illegitimacy and manipulation 
that Justice Scalia has cited in opposing the use of legislative history to 
construe ambiguous statutes.172 
Yet Justice Scalia has joined all of the Court’s recent constitutional 
federalism decisions without any comment on the evident tension they present 
with his otherwise fervently maintained methodological positions.  As Phil 
Frickey and Steven Smith have recently written in connection with process-
based review in Commerce Clause and Section 5 cases, “[t]he majority’s 
constitutional methodology of due deliberation in congressional proceedings is 
so dramatically inconsistent with the statutory interpretation methodology of 
[Justice Scalia] that concerns about candor and strategic behavior are 
obvious.”173 
Another source of evidence tending to suggest that Justice Scalia has been 
behaving strategically is the content of the three states’ rights opinions he has 
been assigned to write for the five-Justice majority.  Although judgments about 
these things are necessarily subjective, it is my impression that these opinions 
reflect relatively little enthusiasm or engagement with the immediate question 
at hand—constitutional federalism.174  Take Printz v. United States,175 his first 
majority assignment in a post-Lopez federalism case.  It is striking to compare 
Justice O’Connor’s 1992 opinion for the Court in New York v. United States176 
with Justice Scalia’s 1997 opinion in Printz.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
speaks with conviction and advances a clear theory of the case: that federal 
statutes compelling state governments to enforce federal law destroy the 
accountability of both federal and state governments and, hence, undermine the 
integrity of the democratic process.  Justice Scalia’s opinion, by contrast, is 
listless and defensive; it begins by acknowledging that no textual provision of 
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the Constitution addresses the issue, spends many pages arguing against the 
proposition that the anti-commandeering principle of New York is contrary to 
historical practice and understandings, and ultimately finds the “most 
conclusive[]” affirmative case to be the Court’s “prior jurisprudence,”177 
meaning Justice O’Connor’s opinion five years earlier in New York. 
Finally, there is also considerable evidence in his three assigned opinions 
that Justice Scalia has sought to use these opportunities to create doctrine that 
will have spillover effects in other areas of constitutional law.  That is to say, 
Justice Scalia’s federalism opinions tend not to be about federalism, but about 
something else, if at all possible.  In Printz, for example, his otherwise wooden 
opinion becomes animated only when discussing a structural reason for 
invalidating federal laws commandeering state officers, namely, that this 
“shatter[s]” the principle of the unitary executive, thereby permitting Congress 
to reduce the power of the President.178  Here we see Justice Scalia attempting 
to re-ground the anti-commandeering principle in the separation of powers 
doctrine of the unitary executive, a Scalia favorite rejected by the Court in 
Morrison,179 but which he has subsequently sought to promote indirectly in a 
number of contexts.180 
The desire to use federalism cases to achieve other ends appears even more 
starkly in his majority opinion in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. 
United States ex rel. Stevens.181  The Court had granted certiorari presumably 
to resolve a conflict in the circuits over whether the Eleventh Amendment bars 
an action against a state by an individual bringing a qui tam suit in the name of 
the United States.182  Justice Scalia threw himself with considerable gusto into 
the threshold question whether qui tam suits violate the cases and controversies 
limitation of Article III of the Constitution.  This, of course, is another 
separation of powers question, not a federalism question, and he resolved it in 
favor of constitutionality—but with minimal damage to the unitary executive 
theory—by reasoning that the qui tam relator acts as an assignee of the claim 
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of the United States.  Then, after puzzling briefly over which issue should be 
tackled next—the Eleventh Amendment or the question of statutory 
interpretation whether states are “persons” under the False Claims Act—he 
resolved to decide the statutory question first.  The conclusion was that 
Congress had not clearly included states within the definition of person; hence, 
it was unnecessary to reach the Eleventh Amendment question.  The upshot 
was that Justice Scalia was able to write a separation of powers opinion and a 
statutory interpretation opinion—two congenial exercises—and avoided 
having to say anything about federalism at all. 
A similar pattern can be discerned in College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board.183  This was another 
Eleventh Amendment case, the question being whether Congress could create a 
cause of action against state governments for engaging in false advertising 
about a commercial product offered by a state agency.  Two issues were 
presented: first, whether Congress had the power to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity against such a suit under Section 5, on the ground that the legislation 
protected individuals from deprivations of their property without due process 
of law by states; and second, whether the state had constructively waived its 
immunity by entering the commercial marketplace with knowledge of the 
existence of the federal cause of action. 
On the abrogation issue, Justice Scalia avoided the path of other recent 
Section 5 decisions, which examine whether Congress has developed an 
adequate record of state disregard of constitutional rights to justify legislation 
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against the States.184  Instead, Justice 
Scalia reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply because the 
plaintiff had no property right in being free of false advertising.  In effect, he 
confined the scope of “property” under the Due Process Clause to private 
exclusion rights—a holding that avoided any need to delve into legislative 
history, and that might work in future cases to cut back the scope of 
substantive due process (a disfavored doctrine in Justice Scalia’s eyes).185  
With respect to waiver, Justice Scalia was able to write an essay on the general 
circumstances in which an individual can be said to waive a constitutional 
right.  The central point was that the Court generally requires that such waivers 
be knowing and voluntary, conditions Scalia found not satisfied by merely 
entering a certain field of commercial activity.186  Again, the objective seemed 
to be at least in part to reinforce the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, rather 
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than enter into the fray on the question of the proper scope of sovereign 
immunity per se.  In any event, Scalia managed once again to write a majority 
opinion in a federalism case without saying much about states’ rights.  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that Justice Scalia’s support for the Rehnquist 
majority in these cases is strategic. 
C. Circumstantial Evidence Against the Strategic Hypothesis 
Not all the circumstantial evidence supports the strategic actor hypothesis, 
however.  There are, first of all, a number of problems of timing.  The biggest 
is Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,187 
written in 1989.  The question was whether an amendment to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, defining the parties potentially liable to pay for waste cleanup costs, had 
abrogated the states’ immunity from such suits under the Eleventh 
Amendment.  The Justices addressed two issues: first, whether Congress had 
spoken sufficiently clearly in the CERCLA amendment to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity and, second, whether Congress, in fact, has constitutional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  The Court fractured badly, but when the dust settled 
there were five votes for the proposition that Congress had spoken sufficiently 
clearly, and five votes for the proposition that Congress had the power.  Justice 
Scalia’s separate opinion contributed to the complex math needed to patch 
together this outcome.188  He took the position that Congress had spoken 
sufficiently clearly, but that it did not have the power to abrogate.  On the latter 
point, Justice Scalia’s opinion foreshadowed the Court’s decision in Seminole 
Tribe189 in 1996, which overruled Union Gas. 
On its face, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Union Gas would suggest that, at 
least with respect to the Eleventh Amendment, he willingly joined up with the 
states’ rights coalition in 1989, well before the critical period of 1993-94 when 
I have suggested a strategic actor in his position would have made such a 
move.  A closer consideration of his position in Union Gas, however, does not 
completely support this assessment.  If Scalia had deliberately decided to join 
forces with the federalism team in 1989, one would expect him to agree with 
the other conservatives that CERCLA did not clearly abrogate the states’ 
immunity.  This would have changed the outcome in the case (since Justice 
White found that Congress had not clearly abrogated), delivering a 5-4 
conservative victory.  In contrast, the position he adopted (clear abrogation, but 
no power to abrogate) translated into a conservative defeat by giving the 
liberals five votes in support of state liability—hardly what a true believer in 
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states’ rights would desire.  Still, Justice Scalia had undeniably crossed the 
Rubicon on whether Congress has power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment 
under its Article I powers, a proposition that forms one of the pillars of the 
federalism revolution of the second Rehnquist Court, and he did so in 1989—
well before the watershed events that marked the turning point in the character 
of that Court. 
New York v. United States190 marks another, if lesser, problem of timing.  
There, Justice Scalia silently joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion creating 
another pillar of the Rehnquist federalism revolution—the anti-commandeering 
principle of the Tenth Amendment.  This was in 1992, again slightly before the 
time period when I have hypothesized that a strategic Justice Scalia would 
have become a federalist.  Of course, it is possible that Justice Scalia was being 
strategic in this case for more conventional reasons.  Both Casey191 and Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,192 a landmark takings case in which Scalia 
was critically dependent on Justice O’Connor’s vote, were also pending before 
the Court, and Justice Scalia may have been anxious to appear supportive of 
Justice O’Connor’s efforts in New York in the hope of securing reciprocal 
cooperation in these other cases (he failed, of course, in Casey, but succeeded 
in Lucas). 
Somewhat more subtly, there is evidence from Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinions from as late as 1996 that he continued to assess the progress of the 
Court largely in terms of its judgments in cases raising social issues.  This was 
the year of the Colorado anti-gay rights initiative193 and the VMI sex 
discrimination case,194 both of which elicited furious Scalia dissents.  His 
frustration boiled over at the end of the Term.  Dissenting in a pair of First 
Amendment-political patronage decisions, he wrote: “The Court must be living 
in another world.  Day by day, case by case, it is busy designing a Constitution 
for a country I do not recognize.”195  Justice Scalia made no mention in this 
dire assessment of Seminole Tribe,196 also decided that Term, or Lopez,197 
decided the year before.  Evidently, these conservative victories did not loom 
very large in his thinking about the overall direction of the Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
My strategic hypothesis also posits that after 1993 Justice Scalia would 
deliberately abstain from voting to grant review in social issues cases, 
recognizing that he did not have the votes to achieve his substantive 
 
 190. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 191. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 192. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 193. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 194. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 195. Bd. of County Comm’rs, v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 196. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 197. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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objectives.198  Since we do not have docket sheets for the years in question, it 
is impossible to say for sure how Justice Scalia has voted in such cases after 
1993.  The fragmentary evidence that does exist, however, is not consistent 
with this supposition of strategic self-restraint on his part.  In fact, Justice 
Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and either Justice White or Justice Thomas, 
has dissented from denials of certiorari in three abortion cases since Casey, 
including two that arose after Justice White left the Court.199  Similarly, in 
2001 the Court declined to review a decision ordering the removal of a granite 
monument outside the Elkhart, Indiana court house commemorating the Ten 
Commandments.  Once again, three Justices joined in a written dissent from 
denial—Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.200  
These episodes tend to suggest that it is not the most conservative Justices, 
including Justice Scalia, who are resisting the urge to put hot button social 
issues cases on the docket.  Rather, that resistance is coming from Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy, who are evidently content to leave the Court’s 
doctrine in these areas where it stands. 
D. On Balance 
So is the phenomenon of the second Rehnquist Court a product of strategic 
behavior by Justice Scalia or not?  The final judgment is difficult because it is 
hard to distinguish between two characterizations of the evidence: (1) that 
Justice Scalia has been behaving strategically in the constitutional federalism 
cases, in the sense that he does not sincerely believe in the Court’s innovations 
but has gone along out of a desire to achieve some of the goals listed in subpart 
A (obtaining majority opinion assignments, building up obligations of 
reciprocity with other Justices, pleasing the Chief, ensuring a legacy); and (2) 
that Justice Scalia has not been behaving strategically, because he sincerely 
 
 198. Political scientists have shown that Justices at least occasionally vote strategically at the 
certiorari stage in light of the their assessments of the probable votes of other Justices on the 
merits of the case.  See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991) (interview data); Caldeira et al., supra note 74 
(regression analysis of all petitions on the discuss list in one Term). 
 199. See Voinovich v. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp., 523 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1998) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari from 
decision striking down state abortion statute on the authority of Casey); Janklow v. Planned 
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic,  517 U.S. 1174, 1176 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari from decision invalidating 
parental notification statute); Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obsts. and Gyns., 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & White, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari 
from decision striking down as facially invalid a Guam statute prohibiting all non-emergency 
abortions). 
 200. City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1059 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined 
by Scalia & Thomas, JJ.). 
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believes that the states’ rights position in these cases is marginally preferable 
to the nationalist position. 
My own judgment is that evidence somewhat better supports the strategic 
characterization.  First, this is not a situation where Justice Scalia’s behavior 
can be chalked up to a sincere desire for clear majority rulings on issues of 
importance.  Justice Scalia presumably could implement such a desire either by 
voting with the states’ rights faction, or voting with the nationalist faction.  In a 
closely divided Court, he is, in effect, the swing vote on this issue and could 
produce a clear majority ruling by going either way. 
Second, Justice Scalia’s voting record in recent years has gone well 
beyond what one would expect of a Justice with only a mildly sincere 
preference for the states’ rights position.  Take the Eleventh Amendment.  
Even if we grant that Justice Scalia sincerely concluded in 1989 that Hans201 
should not be overruled on grounds of stare decisis, it does not follow that he 
would then feel compelled to join opinions extending the Eleventh Amendment 
to actions filed in states’ courts or federal administrative agencies.  Someone 
who sincerely thought that the case for preserving Hans was slightly better 
than the case for overruling Hans would most logically take the position 
thereafter that the principle of Hans should be confined to its historical sphere 
(that is, private actions against states in federal courts).  Instead, Justice Scalia 
has joined in a series of 5-4 decisions that have transformed the Eleventh 
Amendment into one of our most sweeping and vigorously enforced 
constitutional rights. 
So I conclude that Justice Scalia has been behaving strategically and that 
the consequences have been huge.  I will be the first to acknowledge, however, 
that a final accounting on this intriguing question will have to await further 
excavations of more complete archival materials. 
V.  THE EXTERNAL STRATEGIC ACTOR MODEL: TIMIDITY AT THE CENTER 
In addition to strategic behavior within the Court, political scientists have 
also hypothesized that Justices behave strategically by modifying their 
preferences in light of the views of other political institutions and the general 
public.  They do so, it is assumed, because they want their policy preferences 
to stick—to be respected and enforced by other power centers in society.  The 
external strategic actor model, like its internal counterpart, begins with the 
assumption that Justices seek to maximize their personal policy preferences.202  
It further posits, however, that to accomplish this goal, the Justices must not 
only assemble coalitions of at least five votes within the Court, they must also 
 
 201. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 202. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress 
and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 28-33 (1997) (providing an overview of this branch of 
strategic actor theory). 
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calibrate the reactions of other political institutions and the public at large in 
order to determine how far those views can be pressed without triggering a 
backlash.  The external strategic model therefore comes in two versions: the 
separation-of-powers version, which focuses on strategic interaction between 
the Court and the other branches of government,203 and the public opinion 
version, which focuses on the strategic interaction between the Court and the 
views of the public.204 
Both versions hypothesize highly sophisticated behavior on the part of 
individual Justices.  The separation of powers version assumes that the Justices 
have extensive knowledge about the preferences of each House of Congress, 
including the key members of its complex committee system, and that they 
have relevant information about the policy positions of important actors within 
the executive branch, including not just the White House, but also the far-flung 
system of administrative departments and agencies.  The public opinion 
version assumes that the Justices are aware of the distribution of views of the 
public on a variety of issues that come before the Court, and that they know 
something about the intensity with which those views are held and how they 
are distributed demographically. 
These are rather heroic assumptions, to say the least, and they lend an air 
of implausibility to the external strategic actor models.205  Although the 
Justices read newspapers, and some of them socialize with Washington 
politicians, they generally lead insulated lives, spending most of their days 
ensconced in a marble building overseeing a staff of eager young lawyers 
processing piles of legal papers.  When they venture forth to make speeches or 
receive awards, they are escorted by U.S. Marshals and treated by their hosts 
like visiting royalty.  To be sure, the Justices may be able to rely on various 
proxies for the views of other political institutions and the general public, such 
as amicus curiae briefs, the filing of which has ballooned in recent decades.206 
Undoubtedly, the most important source of information for the Court about 
the views of the other branches is the Solicitor General, the official in the 
Justice Department who is charged by statute with presenting the position of 
the government in any case “in which the United States is interested.”207  
Except in rare cases, the Solicitor General represents all executive branch 
 
 203. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 138.  For an analysis by a legal scholar amplifying 
some of these concerns, see Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149 (1998). 
 204. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 138. 
 205. See Segal, supra note 202, at 31 (noting that the theory assumes perfect and complete 
information by Justices). 
 206. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000) (documenting the rise of amicus 
briefs and attempting to measure their influence). 
 207. 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (2000). 
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entities before the Court—traditional departments and independent agencies 
alike.  Moreover, the Solicitor General usually—but not always—represents 
the views of both the executive and Congress.208  Thus, the Solicitor General 
acts as a kind of synthesizer who presents the Court with a position that the 
other branches of the federal government can “live with.”  The external 
strategic actor model would predict that the Court would give great weight to 
these views, and, in fact, innumerable studies have shown that the Solicitor 
General enjoys an extraordinary degree of success, both in influencing the 
Court’s agenda and its outcomes.209 
A. The Separation of Powers Version 
The separations of powers version of the external strategic actor model is 
especially intriguing as a source of explanation for the changing character of 
the Rehnquist Court after 1994.210  This date corresponds almost exactly with 
an inversion in control of the two other major branches of the federal 
government.  As of 1992, a conservative administration and liberal legislature 
had come to be seen as almost part of the natural political order.  The 
Republicans had controlled the White House for twelve straight years, and for 
twenty of the last twenty-four years.  During this same span of time, Congress 
had been nearly always controlled by the Democrats. Then, in the span of two 
years, everything turned upside down.  Bill Clinton ousted George Bush senior 
from the White House in the election of 1992; just two years later, the 
Republicans roared into control of both Houses of Congress under the banner 
of their “Contract with America.”  For the first time in most people’s memory, 
suddenly we had a liberal administration and conservative legislature. 
How would a Court dominated by a narrow conservative majority react to 
such an upheaval in the external political world?  One prediction would be that 
the Court would become less deferential to executive branch legal positions.  
The argument runs as follows: Before 1993 the executive would tend to adopt 
conservative legal positions. These positions might not reflect the 
 
 208. At least, Solicitors General have generally recognized an obligation to defend the 
statutes enacted by Congress before the Court, unless they impinge upon the constitutional 
prerogatives of the executive or are patently unconstitutiuonal under settled precedent.  For a 
discussion, see Waxman, supra note 51. 
 209. See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 145, at 632 tbl.7-13 (success rates on the merits); 
Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988) (success rates in influencing grant of 
review). 
 210. This model is one of the few political science theories about judicial behavior that has 
been developed and applied extensively by a law professor, William Eskridge of Yale Law 
School.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions]; Eskridge, supra note 15. 
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administration’s sincere conservative views—they would be moderated by the 
threat of override by the more liberal Congress.  Congressional override, 
however, would not be automatic, of course, since Congress has a finite 
capacity to adopt legislation in any given session, and any attempt at override 
must take into account the threat of a presidential veto.  So the administration’s 
legal positions would tend to be conservative, but tempered by the strategic 
reality of potential congressional opposition.  A strategic conservative Justice, 
in turn, understanding this, would tend to endorse the positions of the 
conservative administration, regarding them as a reasonably good barometer of 
how conservative one could get in interpreting the law without triggering a 
legislative override. 
After 1994, the calculus would change.  Now the executive would tend to 
adopt liberal legal positions, tempered by the threat of override from what is 
now a conservative, but as always agenda- and veto-constrained, Congress.  In 
these circumstances, a strategic conservative Justice would have a greater 
incentive to reject the executive position.  The executive might successfully 
calibrate its positions so as to minimize the risk of direct override by Congress.  
If those positions were rejected by the Court in favor of a more conservative 
interpretation, however, the executive would find it virtually impossible to 
mobilize a conservative Congress to take affirmative steps to override the 
Court’s interpretation.  In short, the external strategic actor model would 
predict that the strategic conservative Justice would switch from a position of 
deference to executive interpretations of law during the 1986-1992 period, to a 
position tending to reject executive interpretations during the 1995-2001 
period. 
It is not difficult to find individual cases that are consistent with this 
hypothesis.  Compare, for example, Rust v. Sullivan,211 decided toward the end 
of the first Rehnquist Court in 1991, with FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.,212 decided during the second Rehnquist Court in 2000.  Rust 
involved the Public Heath Service Act of 1970, a statute that provides federal 
grants to family planning clinics.  The Reagan Administration adopted a 
regulation interpreting the statute as precluding any mention of abortion by 
doctors providing counseling to women in clinics funded under the Act.  The 
administration apparently calculated (correctly, it would seem) that Congress 
would not seek to override the interpretation, since it involved funding of 
clinics serving poor women, but did not interfere with reproductive options of 
women more generally.  True to what the external strategic actor model would 
seem to predict, the first Rehnquist Court upheld this restrictive interpretation, 
concluding in a 5-4 decision that it was entitled to deference, notwithstanding 
the presence of plausible constitutional objections based on the First 
 
 211. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
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Amendment and the abortion decisions.  This would seem to be an illustration 
of a conservative Court majority deferring to the judgment of a conservative 
administration and avoiding override by a liberal Congress.213 
Brown & Williamson, decided during the second Rehnquist Court, 
presented the question of whether the Food and Drug Administration has 
regulatory jurisdiction over tobacco products as conventionally marketed.  The 
Clinton Administration, in one of its boldest domestic policy initiatives, 
interpreted the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as conferring such 
authority on the FDA, even though the FDA had consistently disclaimed such 
authority in the past.  The agency proceeded to adopt far-reaching regulations, 
designed to curb smoking by teens, that would affect the way cigarettes are 
marketed and sold in every corner store in the country.  In another 5-4 
decision, the Court invalidated the regulations, holding that the overall pattern 
of legislation related to tobacco products, enacted against the backdrop of the 
FDA’s historical hands-off position, meant that Congress had a “clear intent” 
to deny the agency any jurisdiction over tobacco products.  Here, we would 
seem to have an illustration of a conservative majority overriding an 
interpretation by a liberal administration.  So far, the conservative Congress 
has not moved on legislation that would reverse the decision and confer 
regulatory authority over tobacco products on the FDA.214 
This kind of anecdotal evidence is not especially persuasive, however, 
since it is always possible to find isolated cases that appear to support a 
particular prediction about judicial behavior.  Unfortunately, more systematic 
testing of the external strategic actor hypothesis is difficult  for a variety of 
reasons.  One problem is that the cases involving executive interpretations of 
statutes that might test the hypothesis range from highly controversial 
questions of public policy—such as the abortion counseling regulation in Rust 
and the tobacco marketing regulations in Brown & Williamson—to dry and 
technical issues—such as how to calculate offsets to social security benefits for 
past overpayments.215  Thus, some cases will elicit strong reactions from the 
Justices based on their individual policy preferences, and others will not.  
Where the Justices do not care much about the policy, presumably they will 
not devote much time to pondering the reactions of the other branches to their 
decision.  Another problem is time lags.  Sometimes executive interpretations 
come before the Court many years after they have been promulgated, and the 
 
 213. As one of his first official acts as President, Bill Clinton directed that the interpretation 
be reversed.  See Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us About 
American Politics, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 305 (1994).  The new interpretation also avoided 
override by Congress. 
 214. Senator Edward Kennedy has introduced legislation to overturn the decision, but so far it 
has not made significant progress.  See Allison Fass, Senator Kennedy’s Attempt to Give the 
F.D.A. Power Over the Tobacco Industry Faces Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at C9. 
 215. See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990). 
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degree of commitment of the current administration to the interpretation is 
unclear.  A third problem is that the Court gives different degrees of deference 
to executive interpretations, depending on the formality with which the 
interpretation has been rendered.216  Finally, the cases present infinite variety 
in terms of how much interpretative latitude the statute in question truly 
confers.  All Justices are committed to invalidating executive action that is 
manifestly inconsistent with legislation duly enacted by Congress.  So legal 
factors always have to be weighed against the desire to effectuate policy 
preferences.  Given all these difficulties, it is not necessarily meaningful to 
compare the overall “affirmance” and “reversal” rate for executive 
interpretations in the two Rehnquist Courts. 
In an effort to avoid some of these problems, I offer a more limited study, 
based on the Court’s acceptance or rejection of the Solicitor General’s position 
in cases involving interpretations of civil rights statutes.217  These are all cases 
in which the Court’s decision is subject to override by Congress.  They are also 
cases in which the Justices almost always know the position of the executive 
branch because the Solicitor General invariably files a brief informing the 
Court of the incumbent administration’s position about how the statute should 
be interpreted.  Finally, nearly all these cases involve issues that have 
relatively high political salience, and, hence, the Justices are likely to have 
policy preferences about how they should be resolved. 
Specifically, I examined all civil rights cases decided by the first Rehnquist 
Court during the last three years of the Reagan Administration (October Terms 
1986, 1987, and 1988), and compared this to all civil rights cases decided by 
the second Rehnquist Court during the last three years of the Clinton 
Administration (October Terms 1997, 1998, and 1999).  By coincidence, there 
were twenty-three civil rights decisions during each three-year period.  In all 
but one of the forty-six cases, the Solicitor General filed a brief, either as a 
party or, more commonly, as amicus curiae.  For each case, I determined the 
position of the Solicitor General, the disposition of the Court, and, if the 
Court’s disposition differed from the position of the Solicitor General, whether 
the disagreement was in the direction of a more “liberal” position (pro-plaintiff 
or expansive view of civil rights), a more “conservative” position (pro-
defendant or narrow view of civil rights), or an “unclear” position (not easy to 
 
 216. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. 
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 852-63 (2001). 
 217. I include in the category of civil rights statutes Sections 1981 and 1982 of the original 
Civil Rights Acts, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, and more recent enactments such as 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.  I consider only cases that turn on the proper interpretation of these statutes (as 
opposed to their constitutionality). 
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categorize or no Solicitor General brief).  The results are summarized in Table 
1 below.218 
TABLE 1 
 
Civil Rights Cases: Agreement With Solicitor General 
 
 Total 
Cases 
Agree 
w/ 
SG 
Disagree 
w/ SG 
SG 
Success 
Rate 
Liberal 
Deviation 
Conservative 
Deviation 
Unclear 
 
OT 
86-
88 
23 10 12 43% 8 2 2 
OT 
97-
99 
23 17 6 74% 0 6 0 
 
The results are inconsistent with what the separation of powers model 
would suggest in a number of ways.  The model suggests that during the first 
Rehnquist Court, the conservative majority would be especially deferential to 
the conservative administration.  Instead, we find that the Court adopted the 
position advocated by the Solicitor General in only 43% of these cases—well 
below the overall benchmark rate of success of the Solicitor General as amicus 
filer (about 70%).219  Moreover, when the Court during these years rejected the 
position of the Solicitor General, it was much more likely to do so in a liberal, 
rather than a conservative, direction.  To confound matters even further, 
shortly after this period, Congress retaliated against the overly “conservative” 
nature of the Court’s civil rights decisions by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 
1991,220 which overruled no less than six of the Court’s civil rights decisions 
from the three years in question.221  Thus, it would appear that either the Court 
 
 218. The cases used to generate Table 1 are listed in Appendix B at the end of this lecture. 
 219. See Reginald S. Sheehan, et al., Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct 
Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464, 465 tbl.1 (1992) (reporting 67.3% 
success rate for the Solicitor General representing the United States as a party from 1951-1988); 
Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren and Burger 
Courts: A Research Note, 41 W. POL. Q. 135, 136 (1988) (reporting 75% success rate for 
Solicitor General as amicus curiae during similar period). 
 220. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 221. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled five of these decisions: Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance 
v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  The sixth decision, Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of 
Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), was separately overruled by the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also 
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was not being very strategic during this period, or that the Justice Department 
did a poor job of gauging how far the law could be pressed without triggering a 
congressional reaction, or both. 
A closer look at the decisions during this period reveals some possible 
explanations for these curious results.  The liberal deviations nearly all occur in 
the 1986 and 1987 Terms and, hence, may in part reflect the fact that Justices 
White and Powell (and even Justice Scalia during this time period) were far 
from invariably conservative in civil rights cases.  By the time we get to the 
October 1988 Term, however, the Court had shifted toward a much more 
consistently conservative pattern in its rulings.  Indeed, in this year the Court 
rejected the Solicitor General’s position in favor of an even more conservative 
position in two cases, both of which became targets in the congressional 
overruling exercise.222  So it may be that the administration was not that far off 
in calibrating how far the Court could go without triggering congressional 
retaliation, but the Court undershot the mark in 1987 and 1988, and then 
overshot the mark in 1989.  Obviously, however, even this revised 
interpretation provides no support for the thesis that the Justices behave 
strategically in the sense of calculating the risk of retaliation from other 
branches of government.  It appears more accurate to characterize the first 
Rehnquist Court as bungling along in a very nonstrategic fashion in civil rights 
cases. 
When we look at the years 1997, 1998, and 1999 during the second 
Rehnquist Court, we also find that the outcomes do not correspond with the 
predictions of the model.  During these years, the Court agreed with the 
submission of the Solicitor General 74% of the time, which is at or slightly 
above the overall success rate of the Solicitor General.  In other words, the 
Court was considerably more deferential to the Clinton Administration in civil 
rights cases than it had been to the Reagan Administration.  The only inkling of 
a result that corresponds with the model is that when the Court deviated from 
the path outlined by the Solicitor General in these years, it invariably did so by 
adopting a more conservative position.  Overall, however, although the second 
Rehnquist Court appears to behave much more consistently in civil rights cases 
than the first Rehnquist Court, one would have to characterize its behavior as 
at most very mildly strategic in a separation of powers sense. 
I do not suggest that this modest study is, in any respect, the last word on 
the separation of powers model.  It does suggest, however, that this version of 
the external strategic actor model is of limited value in explaining the 
 
overruled seven other decisions not included in my sample.  See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 210, at 333 n.4 (1991).  
 222. The two cases were Betts and Lorance, see supra note 221.  In the negotiations over the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Bush Administration did not object to the overruling of these two 
decisions. 
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differences between the first and second Rehnquist Courts.223  This is not to 
say that the switch in control of political branches after 1994 has played no 
role at all in the transformation of the Rehnquist Court.  Most critically, 
Republican control of Congress has probably eliminated any significant risk of 
a congressional counterattack against the Court’s many invalidations of its 
enactments based on States’ rights principles.  It has been reported that key 
Republicans in Congress are “‘comfortable with most of the Court’s 
rulings,’”224 which, of course, greatly reduces, if it does not eliminate, any 
threat to overturn them.  Indeed, there has been no indication to date of any 
backlash against the federalism rulings from Congress. 
B. Public Opinion 
The second version of the external strategic actor model focuses on public 
opinion.  Political scientists have long been fascinated by the possibility that 
the Justices, although insulated by design from public accountability, in fact 
take public opinion into account in formulating their more important 
decisions.225  The reasons why a strategically-minded Justice might want to 
take public opinion into account are similar to, if slightly more complicated 
than, the reasons why such a Justice might want to take the views of the other 
branches of government into account. 
One reason builds from the logic underlying the proposition that a strategic 
Justice will want to take into account the preferences of other political 
institutions like Congress and the executive.  Again, we start with the 
assumption that the Justice seeks to maximize his or her personal policy 
preferences.  This requires not only that the Justice assemble a coalition of five 
votes inside the Court, but also that the other political branches do not nullify 
the resulting decision.  The other political branches, in turn, are subject to 
periodic elections, and, thus, their preferences will be attuned to public 
opinion.  Ultimately, then, a strategic Justice will realize that the decisions of 
the Court will be implemented by the other branches of government only if 
they do not deviate too far from dominant public opinion. 
Another reason why a Justice might heed public opinion is more direct.  
Various commentators have speculated about the possibility that the Justices, 
or some of them at least, are motivated by a desire to enhance their 
 
 223. See Segal, supra note 202 (expressing skepticism about the empirical support for the 
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reputations.226  Having a good reputation translates into tangible benefits, such 
as expense-paid appearances at seminars held in posh resorts, and intangible 
benefits, such as awards, honors, and praise from editorial writers and other 
opinion leaders.  For a Justice motivated by these kinds of reputational 
concerns, it might be important to assure that the Court reaches decisions 
supported by a majority of the public, or at least by elite opinion leaders, 
because this will tend to push up the “approval ratings” of the Court (and of the 
Justice) and, with it, the Justice’s general reputation.  
The public opinion hypothesis, to a greater extent even than the separation 
of powers model, lacks plausibility as applied to all but a small fraction of the 
Court’s caseload.  Public opinion can be ascertained with confidence on only a 
few issues, like abortion, prayer in public schools, and the death penalty.227  
For most of the issues considered by the Court, there are no polling data, and if 
there were, they would be largely worthless.  Consider the Eleventh 
Amendment, an issue that has excited some of the most energetic exchanges 
among the Justices during the second Rehnquist Court.  If pollsters asked 
members of the general public whether they think the States should enjoy 
immunity from private lawsuits grounded in federal law, the response would 
most likely be: “No opinion.”  Still, one should not rule out the possibility that 
public opinion matters as to the narrow slice of cases in which the issues are 
salient and the public has ascertainable views. 
In considering the role of public opinion in influencing the behavior of the 
Rehnquist Court, it is natural to focus our attention on two Justices: O’Connor 
and Kennedy.  Court watchers have long suggested that these two Justices are 
the most sensitive to external forces.228  Political scientists have also theorized 
 
 226. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, 
Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 619-
24 (2000). 
 227. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 145, at 675-702 (collecting public polling data on a 
variety of issues such as abortion, the death penalty, affirmative action, and prayer in the schools, 
but not federalism and separation of powers issues). 
 228. Indeed, scholars have debated which of the two is the “most dangerous” Justice.  See 
Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63, 96 (1996) (nominating Kennedy); Lynn A. Baker, 
Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV.  187, 206-07 (1996) (responding to Edelman and Chen and nominating 
O’Connor); Edelman & Chen, supra note 19, at 192 (responding to Baker and renominating 
Kennedy).  The answer appears to depend on whether one asks who is most likely to be the 
median voter in contested cases (answer: Justice O’Connor), or asks who demonstrates the 
penchant for joining the greatest variety of coalitions of Justices (answer: Justice Kennedy).  
Lynn Baker has nominated O’Conner based on her status as median voter; Edelman and Chen 
urge that the accolade goes to Kennedy, given his dexterity in joining the largest variety of 
coalitions. 
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that moderate Justices are more likely to be influenced by changes in public 
opinion and have developed statistical tests tending to support this 
proposition.229 
In order to say that public opinion can explain the differences between the 
first and second Rehnquist Courts, it is necessary to show that something 
happened in the early-to-mid-1990s that would have caused the Court, or at 
least Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, to become sensitized to public opinion 
in a way that it or they had not been before.  That is, we need to identify some 
dramatic event or events that would have driven home the reality of public 
opposition in such a way as to have caused certain Justices to abandon the 
conservative position on social issues or, at least, to seek to avoid cases that 
present those issues. 
When we cast our eyes back to the fall of 1991, we can, in fact, reconstruct 
how just such a jolt may have been delivered.  It did not happen in a single 
blow, but rather in a series of events over a compressed period of time, which, 
as far as I know, have never been linked together and considered from the 
perspective of the sitting Justices. 
The first event was the climax of the Clarence Thomas confirmation 
hearings.  The main part of the hearings were completed in the summer of 
1991, and featured many of the same issues that had dominated the hearings 
over the nomination of Robert Bork in 1987—such as abortion, other privacy 
rights, and affirmative action.230  Many of the same political forces that had 
been aligned against Bork also came out against Thomas.  This may have been 
discomforting to the conservative Justices, but no more so than the process had 
been four years earlier when Bork was subjected to a grilling on these issues.  
What was surely far more unsettling was the unexpected reopening of the 
Thomas hearings that took place on national television on October 11-13, 
1991, featuring Anita Hill’s allegations of inappropriate sexual advances and 
Thomas’s heated denial and counter-allegation of racism.  One subliminal 
message this extraordinary spectacle sent to the Justices was that the 
opposition to the nominee and the positions it was assumed he would support 
was extremely intense—so intense that the opponents were willing to breach 
unwritten norms about the type of uncorroborated accusations that are fit for 
public ventilation in confirmation hearings.  The severe hazing of Thomas thus 
served as a warning to the sitting Justices that if they persisted down the path 
 
 229. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and 
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169 (1996).  Mishler 
and Sheehan include Justices O’Connor and Kennedy on the list of moderate Justices from 1953-
1992 who appear to be more responsive to public opinion than other Justices.  Id. at 188. 
 230. See, e.g., 2 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas, supra note 86, at 261-474 (testimony 
of Patricia King, Marcia Greenberger, and Judith Lichtman). 
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of seeking to overturn Roe and securing other conservative objectives, they 
could expect equivalent retaliation of an unspecified nature. 
The second event, which followed close on the heels of the Thomas 
hearings, was the Bush Administration’s capitulation in the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.231  The statute was designed to be, and was, a 
massive rebuke to the Court.  The Bush Justice Department, which included 
many lawyers who had urged the Justices to adopt the positions the statute 
would repudiate, initially fought the measure, and Bush successfully sustained 
a veto of an earlier version of the Act in 1990.  After the debacle of the 
Thomas hearings, however, several Senators who had voted to sustain the 
earlier veto told the Administration it could no longer count on their votes.232  
Seeing the handwriting on the wall, the Administration cut the best face-saving 
deal it could under the circumstances, and the President signed the revised 
measure.  No doubt observing all this with keen interest, the Justices could not 
but help draw the conclusion that the path the Court had been following in civil 
rights cases—often at the urging of the Republican Justice Department—in 
fact, lacked popular political support. 
The third event was the filing of the petition for certiorari in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,233 the abortion case that 
was to become the defining moment of the Rehnquist Court.  The petition was 
filed on November 7, shortly after the Administration announced its 
capitulation on the Civil Rights Act and two weeks before the bill was signed 
into law.  Two things were extraordinary about the petition.  First, it was filed 
more than two months before the filing deadline, indicating that the pro-choice 
petitioners were racing to have the petition granted and argued before the end 
of the 1991 Term.  Second, there was only one question presented: “Has the 
Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding that a 
woman’s right to choose abortion is a fundamental right protected by the 
United States Constitution?”234  Clearly, the petitioners—who favored abortion 
rights—were angling for a definitive showdown on abortion by July 1992.  
Why would they want that?  The most logical inference, which has been 
subsequently confirmed by interviews with the attorneys involved,235 is that 
they were playing a high-stakes game of chicken with the Court.  Either the 
 
 231. For a good account of the politics of the Act, focusing on the position of the Bush 
Administration, see Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 955, 982-999 (1993). 
 232. Id. at 996.  Two Senators, John Warner of Virginia and Ted Stevens of Alaska, informed 
the Administration of their decision on October 23, and the Administration announced its 
willingness to compromise and sign the Civil Rights Act on October 24.  Id. 
 233. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 234. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit at i, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744). 
 235. LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 460-66. 
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Court, reinforced now with the vote of Justice Thomas, would persist in its 
apparent path toward overruling Roe, or the Court would blink and reaffirm 
Roe.  If the Court chose the former path, then the 1992 Presidential elections 
would become a massive referendum on abortion rights, which the petitioners 
assumed they would win, resulting in the election of a Democratic President 
and Senate and the appointment of new Justices sympathetic to Roe.  If the 
Court chose the latter path, then Roe and the right to abortion would be secured 
for the indefinite future. 
There is evidence that the Justices were fully aware of the trap that was 
being set for them.  Chief Justice Rehnquist reportedly relisted the Casey 
petition for several weeks after it was ready for consideration, evidently 
seeking to delay a vote by the Conference until it would be too late to schedule 
the case for argument in the spring of 1992.236  If this happened, then the case 
would be argued in October or November 1992, and the decision would be 
handed down after the Presidential election was safely over.  However, Justice 
Blackmun (perhaps joined by Justice Stevens) protested against this 
transparent maneuver, and Chief Justice Rehnquist eventually relented.237  
When the Casey petition was granted on January 21, the Court made one last, 
desperate effort to avoid a showdown on Roe, limiting the grant of certiorari to 
whether specific provisions of the Pennsylvania statute were 
unconstitutional.238  The parties, however, ignored the limited grant in their 
briefs, and when the case was argued on April 22, 1992 (the last argument day 
of the 1991 Term), they openly debated the soundness of Roe—as, of course, 
the Justices did in their decision. 
In short, in October-November 1991, three events transpired in quick 
succession, which cumulatively may have sent a stark warning to the Court 
that it was courting disaster in terms of its standing with public opinion: the 
public humiliation of Thomas, followed by the Bush Administration’s 
acquiescence in the repudiation of the Court’s position on civil rights, followed 
by the petition in Casey, daring the Court to overrule Roe before the 1992 
elections.  The upshot, as we now know, is that the Court blinked.  Not only 
did five Justices vote to reaffirm the “essential holding” of Roe in Casey, but 
the Court also reaffirmed the strict ban on prayer in public schools in Lee v. 
Weisman.239  The Court’s strategic retreat in June 1992 did not, however, end 
the warning signals about public opinion.  The 1992 elections not only resulted 
in the ouster of George Bush and the election of President Clinton, but—
perhaps more tellingly—they also produced a near doubling in the number of 
 
 236. Id. at 462-63. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 502 U.S. 1056, 1056-57 (1992) (Order 
List). 
 239. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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women elected to serve in Congress.240  Observers have credited a still-
simmering backlash by women voters over the perceived treatment of Anita 
Hill during the Thomas confirmation hearings, as well as continuing concerns 
about abortion rights and civil rights, as important elements in these electoral 
outcomes.241 
What do we have in the way of more specific evidence that would suggest 
these signals about public opinion altered the behavior of the Court, and in 
particular Justices O’Connor and Kennedy?  Certainly once piece of evidence 
is the Casey case itself.  The story of Casey has been told many times and is 
without doubt “one of the most extraordinary in the annals of the modern 
Supreme Court.”242  For our purposes, the main point is that Justices O’Connor 
and Kennedy, both of whom had previously sent signals of disapproval about 
Roe, entered into a secretive cabal with Justice Souter to produce a “joint 
opinion” reaffirming Roe’s central holding of constitutional protection for 
elective abortion.  Without advance notice, they sprang the joint opinion on the 
other members of the Court immediately after the Chief Justice circulated his 
opinion, which was designed to be the opinion for the Court.243  At the end of 
the day, the joint opinion became a plurality opinion for the Court.  Together 
with Justices Blackmun and Stevens, the joint opinion reaffirmed the 
constitutional right to abortion; together with the Rehnquist opinion, joined by 
Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, the joint opinion upheld all of the 
provisions of the challenged statutes, except the spousal consent 
requirement.244 
 
 240. The 103rd Congress elected in 1992 had a total of fifty-four women (forty-seven 
Representatives and seven Senators); the 102nd Congress elected in 1990 had only thirty women 
(twenty-eight Representatives and two Senators).  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT OF 
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001—THE NATIONAL DATA 
BOOK 245 (2001). 
 241. See Alan I. Abramowitz, It’s Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Presidential 
Election, 57 J. POL. 176 (1995) (arguing that abortion was a more critical issue than the economy 
in the 1992 election). 
 242. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLES INSIDE THE REHNQUIST 
COURT 156 (1995). 
 243. LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 473. 
 244. It is relevant to note in this regard that the outcome reached in Casey corresponds closely 
with the abortion control regime preferred by a majority of Americans.  The Court’s decision in 
Roe followed upon an increase in support for elective abortion within both public and elite 
opinion.  See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 260-62 (1991).  Subsequent refinements in the constitutional abortion control regime 
tend to track majoritarian views closely.  For a recent overview of polling data on abortion, 
relating it to different legal issues resolved by the Supreme Court, see Michael Vitiello, How 
Imperial is the Supreme Court?  An Analysis of Supreme Court Abortion Doctrine and Popular 
Will, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 49 (1999). Vitiello reports that, with one exception, the Court’s doctrine 
mirrors the preferences of a majority of the public, as reflected in opinion polls.  The exception is 
spousal consent: The Court has consistently invalidated spousal consents requirements, even 
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Some observers have conjectured that Justice O’Connor’s participation in 
the joint opinion reflects a concern about her reputation.245  The usual claim is 
that O’Connor did not want to be remembered by history as the first woman to 
serve on the Supreme Court, with the immediate caveat that she had betrayed 
her gender by casting the decisive vote to overturn Roe.246  O’Connor’s overall 
record on abortion is consistent with this supposition.  In the 1980s, when there 
was a solid majority in support of Roe, she wrote opinions that were highly 
disparaging of Roe’s trimester framework, and she urged the adoption of an 
“undue burden” test that seemed designed to allow her to vote to approve every 
statutory restriction on abortion that came before the Court.247  Her attitude 
seemed to change in Webster, when she held the balance of power between 
retaining or scuttling Roe.  There, she wrote a separate opinion that strained to 
find a variety of highly restrictive provisions did not pose an undue burden on 
the abortion right, even though Justice Scalia was able to show in his opinion 
that this was implausible.248  The next year, in Hodgson, she voted for the first 
time to invalidate an abortion restriction as being an undue burden.249  Then 
came Casey, where she joined the joint opinion that treated Roe as a kind of 
core, inviolable constitutional right, although one subject to regulation 
provided that it is not an undue burden on the right.  What is constant in all this 
is the focus on undue burdens; what changes, most decisively in Casey, is the 
underlying attitude toward Roe and the way in which the undue burden 
standard is applied. 
We have no hard evidence, however, that the motivation for this evolution 
in Justice O’Connor’s views was concern about her reputation or historical 
legacy.  That is one possible interpretation.  Another is that her sincere views 
simply evolved over time.  The fact that O’Connor voted with the liberals in 
2000 to strike down legislative bans on partial birth abortions250 is consistent 
 
though a majority of the public supports them.  Id. at 94-95.  The congruence between the Casey 
decision and majoritarian views on abortion did not go unnoticed at the time of the decision.  See, 
e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Justices’ Abortion Ruling Mirrors Public Opinion; Polls Show Americans 
Would Keep Procedure Legal, but Are as Divided as Court on Limits, WASH. POST, July 1, 1992, 
at A4. 
 245. Lazarus reports that Justice O’Connor disliked hearing abortion cases because, in the 
words of her brother, “half the people will hate her no matter what she does.” LAZARUS, supra 
note 85, at 470. 
 246. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 242, at 156 (“As the first woman on the Court, O’Connor 
took her role as a model for other women seriously, and was not eager to cast the fifth vote to 
overrule the Court decision.”). 
 247. See Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obsts. & Gyns., 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 248. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); id. at 536 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 249. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 458 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 250. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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with the hypothesis that her sincere beliefs about the value of the underlying 
right, and about the degree of burden necessary to make a burden “undue,” 
have simply changed during her tenure on the Court. 
In Justice Kennedy’s case, the about-face in Casey is much more striking, 
and more strongly suggestive of insincere behavior.  Kennedy joined Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Webster, which applied a rational basis 
test inconsistent with the strict scrutiny mandated by Roe.251  It is reported that 
he circulated a memorandum to the other conservative Justices at the time, 
stating that he was prepared to vote to overrule Roe.252  His participation in the 
Casey joint opinion is quite inconsistent with such a representation.  Moreover, 
there does not appear to be any linear evolution of views in Kennedy’s case, 
since he broke ranks with O’Connor and Souter in the partial-birth abortion 
case in 2000 and wrote a rather impassioned dissent urging that partial birth 
abortion bans be upheld, reverting, it would seem, to the attitude he held back 
in 1989.253 
In Kennedy’s case, therefore, there is greater reason to surmise that he was 
behaving strategically in joining the joint opinion in Casey and reaffirming 
Roe.  The most plausible reason for such strategic behavior would be concern 
on his part about the Court’s standing in the eyes of the public if it took the 
unpopular step of repudiating a constitutional right to abortion.  One might also 
conjecture that Kennedy was worried about the impact of a decision overruling 
Roe on Bush’s reelection chances.  This was a reasonable concern, given the 
obvious strategic design being pursued by the pro-choice forces in seeking to 
have the case decided before the presidential election.  But, of course, it is 
entirely far-fetched to imagine that Justice Kennedy (or any other Justice) 
would decide a case in a particular way in an effort to influence the outcome of 
a Presidential election!254 
Casey is only one case, of course, although one that loomed very large 
both in the eyes of the Justices and the general public.  Yet the inferences that 
can be drawn from Casey are reinforced by Lee v. Weisman,255 which was 
decided only a few days earlier.256  The issue was whether the recitation of a 
nondenominational prayer by a member of the clergy at a middle school 
graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause.  The Court had 
previously mustered four votes for a more accommodating approach to such 
traditional forms of government-sanctioned religious expression, and with the 
 
 251. Webster, 492 U.S. at 498 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy, J.). 
 252. LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 406-07. 
 253. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 956 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 254. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 255. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 256. See LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 471 (reporting that Justice Kennedy voted at conference 
to reject the constitutional challenge in Lee, but changed his mind while working on the opinion 
for the Court and ended up upholding the challenge). 
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addition of Justices Souter and Thomas it seemed that the three-part test of 
Lemon v. Kurtzman257 would likely be abandoned in Lee.  Instead, Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined forces with Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens to produce a majority decision reaffirming the strict rule against prayer 
in public schools.  Justice Kennedy, who had previously been critical of 
Lemon,258 deemed it unnecessary in his opinion for the Court to reconsider 
Lemon in order to reach this result.  Justice O’Connor, who had previously 
been critical of Lemon,259 joined a concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun 
that went out of its way to reaffirm Lemon.260 
The outcome in Lee was probably inconsistent with what a majority of 
Americans would want,261 but there is no question that elite opinion was 
solidly in favor of the rule banning all prayer in public schools.  By switching 
sides and reaffirming the strict separationist position, Justice O’Connor and 
Kennedy spared the Court from another round of critical editorials.  Their 
behavior is at least consistent with the public opinion hypothesis. 
My modest study of civil rights decisions, previously reported in Table 1, 
can also be read as providing inferential support for the public opinion model.  
Recall that the study shows that the Court gave much more deference to the 
Clinton Administration Solicitor General in civil rights cases in the late 1990s 
than it gave to the Reagan Administration Solicitor General in the late 1980s.  
This cannot be explained by the separation of powers model; however, it 
makes perfect sense in terms of the public opinion model, especially after the 
Court had been rebuked by Congress in 1991 for adopting conservative 
positions in civil rights cases.  The fact that both elected branches of 
government signed onto the mass overruling of Supreme Court decisions on 
civil rights told the Court—or at least certain key Justices—that its 
performance in this area was out of step with public opinion. 
Under this explanation for the Court’s more liberal stance on civil rights in 
the 1990s, we would expect to find that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy 
played a key role in assuring that the Court followed the lead of the Solicitor 
General after 1994.  In fact, when we examine more closely the seventeen 
decisions from October Terms 1997-1999 in which the Court accepted the 
views of the Solicitor General, we find, as expected, that Justice O’Connor 
 
 257. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 258. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
 259. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 260. Lee, 505 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 261. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 145, at 694 tbl.8-23 (reporting that no more than 40% of 
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prayer in schools). 
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voted with the majority in sixteen of these cases.  In the one case she did not, 
Justice Kennedy took her place.262 
A further piece of evidence supporting the public opinion model has 
already been mentioned in connection with the discussion of Justice Scalia’s 
strategic behavior.  It appears from published dissents from the denial of 
certiorari during the second Rehnquist Court that the self-restraint shown by 
the Court in not granting petitions presenting cases in the social issues basket 
has not come from Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.  
They have periodically gone public with complaints about the Court’s failure 
to hear such cases.  Rather, the self-restraint appears to be coming from 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy. 
The most plausible basis for this self-restraint would appear to be 
apprehension on the part of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy about the 
reputational costs (for themselves and the Court) if the Court agrees to hear 
such cases.  If Justices O’Connor and Kennedy sincerely preferred to reach 
liberal outcomes in these cases, then the votes would easily be there to hear 
them.  The four liberals alone have the power to grant these cases under the 
rule of four.  The fact that the liberals do not vote to hear these cases suggests 
that they perceive Justices O’Connor and Kennedy as not sincerely preferring 
liberal outcomes in these cases.  The three most conservative Justices, in 
contrast, have indicated by their published dissents that they do want to hear 
these cases.  This may mean that they believe Justices O’Connor and Kennedy 
sincerely prefer the conservative position in these cases.  Therefore, the fact 
that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy do not want to hear these cases may mean 
that they perceive certain costs to flow from the mere fact of considering and 
rendering decisions in these cases.  Perhaps those costs consist of an unhappy 
choice—unhappy at least for Justices O’Connor and Kennedy—between 
incurring the excoriation of the liberal media or the excoriation of their fellow 
conservatives on the Court, especially the sharp-penned Justice Scalia.  To 
avoid this unhappy dilemma, they have engaged in strategic behavior—in the 
form of resisting adding such cases to the Court’s docket, if at all possible. 
The public opinion hypothesis thus allows us to round out our explanation 
for the transformation of the Rehnquist Court that occurred around 1994.  We 
have already seen how the rise of constitutional federalism can be attributed to 
the replacement of Justice White by Justice Thomas and by what appears to 
have been a strategic decision by Justice Scalia to become a consistent 
supporter of states’ rights.  We are now in a position to explain why the Court 
turned away from social issues at the same time: because Justices O’Connor 
 
 262. Only a minority of these cases were 5-4, and some were unanimous.  In divided 
decisions, however, the most common pattern was for Justice O’Connor to switch sides and vote 
with the liberals, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia and Thomas, and sometimes 
Justice Kennedy, in dissent. 
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and Kennedy found the costs of continuing to engage with these issues in terms 
of public opinion to be unacceptably high.  The cases that fall in what I have 
called the social issues basket—abortion, other privacy rights, affirmative 
action, and public expression on religious topics—all involve questions as to 
which most people have an ascertainable opinion.  The general public opposes 
the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas view on only some of these issues—namely, 
abortion and privacy rights.  There is little doubt, however, that elite opinion as 
reflected in major media outlets opposes the conservative judicial view on all 
these issues.263 
In contrast, although the cases in what I have called the federalism basket 
involve issues that are quite controversial among lawyers, so far the public 
reaction to these decisions has been nil.  As Neal Devins has explained, the 
Court’s recent federalism decisions have not prevented Congress from 
responding to constituent demands by using other powers like the Spending 
Clause.  Moreover, because much of what has been struck down is “redundant 
of state enactments,” Congress has felt “relatively little constituent pressure to 
respond to the Court.”264  Thus, for Justices who are anxious to achieve some 
constitutional change that can be described as “conservative” but are skittish 
about public opinion and the possibility of backlash against such change, the 
states’ rights campaign is virtually ideal. 
Although the pieces of the puzzle are now starting to fall together, this still 
leaves unexplained several distinguishing attributes of the second Rehnquist 
Court—such as the greatly diminished size of the case load, the increase in 5-4 
decisions, and the decline in plurality opinions.  To explain these 
developments, we need a new theory. 
VI.  THE IMPORTANCE OF MEMBERSHIP FLUX AND STASIS 
In order to make a final pass at explaining the differences between the first 
and second Rehnquist Court, I will focus on one very obvious institutional 
difference: the first Rehnquist Court experienced extensive and frequent 
changes in membership, while the second Rehnquist Court has experienced no 
change in membership—it has functioned with the same cast of characters now 
for over eight uninterrupted years.  Neither legal scholars nor political 
scientists have paid much attention to the possible significance of membership 
 
 263. For an anticipation of this thesis, couched in normative rather than positive terms, see 
Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1178 (1988) 
(interpreting Bork’s defeat by the Senate in 1987 “as a marker of a failed constitutional moment, 
in which a political movement, after raising a new agenda for constitutional reform, fails to 
generate the kind of deep and broad support necessary to legitimate a change in” constitutional 
law). 
 264. Devins, supra note 224, at 461. 
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flux versus membership stasis in analyzing judicial behavior over time.265  So I 
am operating here in largely uncharted territory.  Nevertheless, it seems to me 
that there are three differences one might expect from a Court in stasis as 
opposed to a Court in flux.  I will leave to others any attempt to develop these 
or other differences into a more formal model, although it seems to me that this 
is something that profitably could be modeled and empirically tested. 
A. Receptivity to Change in Institutional Norms 
First, a Court in flux is more likely to be amenable to changes in 
institutional norms than is a Court in stasis.  The Court, like other institutions, 
is governed by consensual norms.  These include things like the rule that it 
takes four votes to hear a case, that opinions are assigned by the senior Justice 
in the majority, that the deliberations of the Court take place in secret, and so 
forth.266  These norms are generally stable and resistant to change.  As Caldeira 
and Zorn observe: 
[S]ocialization to the behavior of the justices is learned from other justices 
upon taking office.  Normally, a single justice joins the Court on which sit 
eight veterans of the institution.  Thus, we expect norms . . . to be propagated 
from one generation of justices to the next, . . . imbuing them with long-
memory characteristics.267 
To the extent the Court’s norms change, we would expect that this will be 
associated with changes in personnel.  Change in norms requires new ideas and 
a willingness to modify established patterns of behavior.  New Justices are 
much more likely to have new ideas and to be receptive to trying them out than 
established Justices will be.  Change is probably most likely to occur with the 
appointment of a new Chief Justice.  Turnover among other Justices, however, 
will be important as well since consensual norms are supported by all members 
of the Court.268  In contrast, when all nine Justices have sat on the Court for 
many years, norm change is highly improbable. 
 
 265. An exception is Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual 
Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POLITICS 361, 373-74 (1988) (briefly discussing 
the possible role of “youth and inexperience” on the Court as contributing to norm change); see 
also Timothy M. Hagle, “Freshmen Effects” for Supreme Court Justices, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
1142 (1993). 
 266. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 118-135; Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher 
J. W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court, 42 AM J. POL. SCI. 875, 876 
(1998). 
 267. Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 266, at 880. 
 268. See Walker et al., supra note 265, at 373-74 (noting the possibility that the sudden rise in 
the percentage of cases with dissenting and concurring opinions in the Stone Court may have 
been due in part to the high percentage of young and inexperienced Justices, and observing that 
“[h]igh levels of inexperience may also provide conditions conducive to a breakdown in decision-
making norms”). 
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We can see some confirmation of this hypothesis in the history of the 
Burger Court.  The Burger Court, like the Rehnquist Court, started off with a 
burst of turnover (Burger, 1969; Blackmun, 1970; Powell, 1972; Rehnquist, 
1972; Stevens, 1975), and then settled down to a long period of stability (six 
years with no turnover from 1975 to 1981).  The early years of the Burger 
Court were a period of significant change for the Court in terms of its practices 
and norms.  The time allotted to oral argument was cut in half (thereby 
doubling the Court’s capacity to hear argued cases), the number of law clerks 
per Justices was doubled (from two to four), the cert. pool was established, and 
even the shape of the bench was changed to permit better interaction among 
Justices at oral argument.269  In addition, the number of cases heard per Term 
jumped up, from around 120 to 150.  In the later years of the Burger Court, 
there were no institutional changes of equivalent magnitude.  A plausible 
explanation for this pattern is that during the early years of the Burger Court, 
new blood (including a new Chief Justice) brought with it new ideas about how 
to discharge the Court’s business, and a receptiveness to adopt these new ideas, 
which was missing during the later period of stasis. 
This hypothesis about flux versus stasis can, I believe, help to understand 
the remarkable reduction in the size of the Court’s docket that we see between 
the first and second Rehnquist Courts.  A variety of explanations have been 
advanced for this phenomenon.270  These theories can be broadly divided into 
external and internal theories.  External theories, which have been endorsed by 
 
 269. See DAVID O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
166 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that the number of law clerks was two per Justice throughout the 
Warren Court and increased to three and then four after 1970); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE 
ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 4 (1990) (describing change in the 
shape of the bench); David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the 
Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 790 (1997) (tracing origins of 
cert. pool to a suggestion made by newly appointed Justice Powell, which was then endorsed by 
Chief Justice Burger). 
 270. For overviews of possible explanations and the evidence for and against each, see 
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist 
Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403.  For longer term trends in the number of opinions issued by the 
Court per year, see Post, supra note 22, at 1280.  Before the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Court 
typically rendered over 200 opinions per year.  This fell to a level of about 100 per year during 
the Vinson Court, increased to about 120 cases per year during the Warren Court, and then 
jumped back up to 150 per year during the Burger Court.  This history suggests that the long-term 
trend is in the direction of fewer opinions per year (200 per year prior to 1925 to 80 per year 
today), but also that significant variations exist from one natural Court to another (for example, 
150 per year under Burger to 80 per year under Rehnquist).  See also Cordray & Cordray, supra, 
at 745-750 (describing how personnel change in the early years of the Vinson Court led to a drop 
in the size of the docket from 150 cases per year to about 100 cases per year). 
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some of the Justices,271 include such factors as Congress’s repeal of most of 
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction in 1988, reduced requests for review filed 
by the Solicitor General, reduced activism by lower court judges, a falloff in 
new legislation during an era of divided government, and greater ideological 
harmony between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.  Internal 
theories include such factors as increased reliance on the cert. pool by Justices 
to screen petitions, a decline in the use of “join-3 votes” by newer members of 
the Court,272 and greater pursuit of leisure by the Justices. 
Referring back to Figure 2 (in Part II), we can see that the explanation for 
the shrinkage in the docket must be to a significant degree internal rather than 
external.  The change in the size of the docket was a phenomenon of the first 
Rehnquist Court, and it occurred quite rapidly and in close connection with 
changes in the personnel on the Court.  The docket began to shrink shortly 
after the ascension of William Rehnquist to the Chief Justiceship and the 
appointment of Antonin Scalia as Associate Justice in October 1986, fell fairly 
steadily for several years, paused at around 115 cases per year in the early 
1990s, and then plunged to a new equilibrium level at around 75-85 argued 
cases per year after the retirement of Justice White—before the beginning of 
what I have called the second Rehnquist Court. 
This pattern is inconsistent with explanations that center on external forces.  
If external forces, such as a decline in lower court activism or increased 
ideological harmony between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, 
were the primary cause, one would not expect to see such a precipitous drop 
followed by a leveling off.  In fact, toward the end of the second Clinton 
Administration, as the courts of appeals began to include increasing numbers 
of Democratic appointees, one could expect to see an uptick as the ideological 
harmony started to wear off.  There is, however, no sign of such an uptick.273  
The one external factor that appears to have some explanatory force is a 
reduction in requests for review by the Solicitor General in civil cases starting 
in the mid-1980s, which apparently tracks a reduction in the number of losses 
experienced by the federal government in such cases in the lower courts.274  
 
 271. Justice Souter has publicly suggested that increased ideological harmony between 
appeals courts and the Supreme Court may provide part of the explanation.  See Shannon P. 
Duffy, Inside the Highest Court: Souter Describes Justices’ Relationship, Caseload Trend, PA. L. 
WEEKLY, Apr. 17, 1995, at 11. 
 272. See O’Brien, supra note 269. 
 273. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 270, at 772. 
 274. Id. at 763-771.  The falloff in government petitions and supported petitions does not 
extend to criminal cases.  Cordray and Cordray show that the decline in government requests in 
the civil area appears to be partly a function of fewer civil suits involving the government, and 
partly a function of higher government success rates in the lower courts in civil cases.  Id. at 768-
770. 
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This factor, however, accounts for, at most, only about one-third of the 
magnitude of the change.275 
The internal explanations have a much better claim to explanatory force.  
The growing dominance of the cert. pool cannot be wholly eliminated as part 
of the explanation.  The pool started out with five chambers participating (the 
four Nixon appointees to the Court plus Justice White) and four not 
participating (Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall).  This 
arrangement assured that each petition received close scrutiny by at least one 
law clerk (the pool clerk); the fact that four chambers remained outside the 
pool and that the clerks in these chambers (at least in theory) reviewed all 
petitions independently provided a check on the pool if for some reason the 
pool clerk missed a case potentially worthy of review.  When Justice O’Connor 
was named to the Court in 1981, she joined the pool, increasing the 
participation to six chambers.  Then, when Justices Brennan and Marshall 
retired in 1990 and 1991, their successors (Justices Souter and Thomas) also 
joined the pool, bringing the participation up to eight chambers.  After 1991, 
only Justice Stevens remained outside the pool.  Justices Ginsburg and Breyer 
also joined the pool, but their participation merely kept the level of 
participating chambers at eight. 
Why might the increasing dominance of the cert. pool lead to a decline in 
the number of cases heard by the Court?  One possibility is that, with only 
Justice Stevens’ chambers now providing a check on the pool clerk, more 
mistakes (in terms of missing potentially important cases) go unchecked.  
Another possibility might be that, with each pool clerk now writing for eight 
Justices of highly diverse views, the pool clerks have adopted a very cautious 
approach to assessing cert. petitions.  With more responsibility for determining 
the cases that make it onto the discuss list, the pool clerks might become more 
risk averse, for fear of missing a potential jurisdictional flaw or other weakness 
in the case that might emerge later in the process, bringing down ridicule on 
their heads.  The influence of the cert. pool, however, seems hardly sufficient 
to explain fully the decline in the docket.  There was no decline when the pool 
expanded from five to six (in 1981), and the recent decline began in 1987, well 
before the further expansions to seven and then eight took place.276 
A better explanation, in my view, is that the decline reflects a new norm 
about the standards that should be applied in determining whether a petition 
qualifies for Supreme Court review—a new norm implanted with the changes 
 
 275. Id. at 764.  Cordray and Cordray estimate that the decline in civil petitions by the 
Solicitor General is responsible for a reduction in about fifteen cases per year, and a decline in 
petitions supported by amicus briefs filed by the Solicitor General for about ten cases per year.  
Id.  This would account for about twenty-five cases out of a total decline of about seventy-five 
cases per year in the size of the docket. 
 276. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 270, at 792-93. 
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in personnel that began in 1986, which then spread and became entrenched as 
other new Justices came on board throughout the first Rehnquist Court.  This is 
consistent with the findings of other scholars who have examined the available 
data, each of whom has concluded that the most plausible explanation for the 
shrinkage in the docket is that the Justices “have been applying a different—
and more rigorous—standard in deciding whether to hear the cases.”277 
The question is: Who is the agent of change that convinced the Justices on 
the first Rehnquist Court to adopt a more rigorous standard in assessing cert. 
petitions?  Ordinarily, one would point to the new Chief Justice as the most 
likely influence in generating a new norm of institutional practice such as the 
standard for reviewing cert. petitions.  The Chief Justice is responsible for 
putting together the initial discuss list of petitions that receive the full attention 
of the Conference, and he leads off the discussion of the cases that are put on 
the list.  The Chief, therefore, undoubtedly has more influence over the size 
and composition of the Court’s docket than any other individual.  Also, the 
timing of the shrinkage is consistent with the hypothesis that Rehnquist is 
responsible: The Court’s docket began to shrink within one year of his 
elevation to Chief Justice. 
There is no evidence, however, that William Rehnquist assumed the office 
of Chief Justice with any intention to cut back on the number of cases heard by 
the Court.  As an Associate Justice, Rehnquist was a frequent filer of dissents 
from denial of certiorari, implicitly advocating that more, rather than fewer, 
cases be heard.278  On the eve of his appointment, he published an article 
bemoaning the inability of the Court to decide more cases and urging the 
creation of the National Court of Appeals to take up the slack.279  Moreover, at 
his confirmation hearings in 1986, he told the Senate “I think the 150 cases 
[per year] that we have turned out quite regularly over a period of 10 or 15 
years is just about where we should be at.”280 
In contrast, we know from published reports that Justice Scalia, from his 
early years on the Court, strongly favored reducing the number of cases heard 
by the Court in order to allow more time for each case and improve the quality 
 
 277. Hellman, supra note 270, at 425.  Accord Cordray & Cordray, supra note 270; O’BRIEN, 
supra note 269, at 166. 
 278. See Arthur D. Hellman, Preserving the Essential Role of the Supreme Court: A Comment 
on Justice Rehnquist’s Proposal, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 15, 26 (1986) (noting that during his last 
eight years as Associate Justice, Justice Rehnquist “published a dissenting opinion or notation in 
more than 120 cases in which the Court denied review”). 
 279. William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1, 10-14 (1986). 
 280. Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States: 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 143 (1986) (statement of 
Hon. William H. Rehnquist). 
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of the Court’s deliberations.281  We also know, based on docket sheets released 
as part of Justice Marshall’s papers, that Justice Scalia voted to grant review 
less frequently than any other Justice on the first Rehnquist Court through the 
1990 Term.282  Although Scalia joined the Court at the same time as Rehnquist 
was elevated to the Chief Justiceship, Scalia’s voice on certiorari policy was a 
new one.  Thus, it is my opinion, although I admit it is only an educated guess, 
that Justice Scalia is the change agent here.  In other words, when Justice 
Scalia joined the Court in 1986, he threw himself with typical gusto into the 
effort to convince the Justices to adopt a more restrictive standard of review.  
His arguments had little effect on the older Justices fixed in their ways, like 
Powell, Brennan, Marshall, White and Blackmun.  As these Justices retired, 
however, and were replaced by new Justices with no pre-established views 
about the appropriate standard of review, Scalia’s ideas about the standard of 
review—and hence the proper size of the docket—gradually prevailed.283 
I am not inclined to attribute any deep strategic significance to what I have 
surmised to be Justice Scalia’s advocacy of a smaller case load.  The decline 
has little to do with the politically-significant cases, which are too few in 
number to explain the shrinkage of the docket we have witnessed.  What has 
happened is that the number of more routine cases involving statutory 
interpretation and civil and criminal procedural rights issues has been cut 
roughly in half.284  If pressed to explain Justice Scalia’s motivation for wanting 
to get rid of half of the lower-profile cases, I would suggest that it may have 
something to do with the fact that he is heavily involved in drafting and 
revising the opinions that issue under his name.  The prospect of doing this 
against a base of 150 decisions a year is far more exhausting than doing so 
against a base of 80 decisions a year.  Other Justices who joined the Court 
during the first Rehnquist years, including Justices Souter and Breyer, are also 
heavily involved in the opinion-production process.  So they too might 
welcome relief from having to produce their share of an extra seventy 
opinions, most of which involve rather routine and unexciting issues.285 
 
 281. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ruing Fixed Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1988, at A16 (reporting 
comments by Justice Scalia in a question-and-answer session at George Washington University 
Law School). 
 282. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 270, at 785 n.242. 
 283. Cordray and Cordray report that through the 1990 Term, Justice Kennedy had the 
second-lowest number of votes for certiorari after Justice Scalia.  Id. 
 284. See Hellman, supra note 278, at 26. 
 285. Another factor that may be relevant here is the recent custom of appointing only current 
court of appeals judges to the Supreme Court.  Doris Provine’s research suggests that a key 
variable in determining a Justice’s propensity to vote to hear cases is his or her level of trust in the 
ability of lower court judges to reach fair results.  DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 116-17 (1980).  Thus, Justices Black and Douglas had a 
generally low opinion of lower court judges and felt it was important to keep a close watch over 
them.  They voted to hear a large number of cases.  Justices Frankfurter and Burton, in contrast, 
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B. Better Information 
Another consequence of the difference between a Court in flux and a Court 
in stasis is the amount of information that the Justices have about the 
preferences (defined broadly to include legal philosophy) of the other Justices 
on the Court.  The Justices never have perfect information about the 
preferences of the other Justices.  They must act on subjective estimates of the 
probability that the other Justices will take certain positions in each case.  
These subjective estimates are continually being updated with each case the 
Court decides as it sits together.  The longer a given Court sits together, the 
more accurate the probability estimates that each Justice will make regarding 
the other Justices. 
The process by which a Court of nine Justices continually updates 
probability estimates of the preferences of other Justices can be described by 
analogy to Bayesian logic.286  Thus, we can say that each Justice starts with a 
certain estimate of the prior probability that another Justice will take a 
particular position x* with respect to issue y*.  As cases are decided that are 
related to the issue in question, such as y’, the Justices develop subjective 
probabilities that express the likelihood that a person who takes position x’ as 
to y’ will also take position x* as to y*.  After observing the position that the 
Justice actually takes on y’, the other Justices then revise their estimate of the 
prior probability that the Justice will take position x* with respect to y*, 
developing a new posterior probability.  This process continues until the Court 
actually considers issue y*, at which time the Justice’s true position as to y* 
(x* or not x*) is finally revealed. 
To make this more concrete, consider the situation when David Souter is 
first appointed to the Court.  The other Justices are all anxious to develop an 
 
were less sensitive to the plight of the petitioner, and concerned themselves primarily with the 
systemic significance of the case.  They voted to hear many fewer cases.  It is possible that the 
recent fall off in certiorari grants may reflect a similar shift in attitudes toward lower court judges 
and a corresponding move away from the importance of error correction in the management of 
the Court’s docket.  Each of the six new Justices named to the Court from 1986 to 1994 had 
previously served as a federal court of appeals judge.  In contrast, a number of the Justices they 
replaced (Rehnquist, Powell, Brennan, and White) did not have such experience.  Prior service on 
the court of appeals may be correlated with an attitude of greater trust toward lower court judges.  
Thus, as we move toward a Court in which a higher percentage of Justices have had such prior 
lower court service, the overall propensity to grant review may decline. 
 286. For a general introduction to Bayesian logic, see Richard D. Friedman, Assessing 
Evidence, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1810 (1996).  There is an extensive debate as to whether or to what 
extent it is accurate to model ordinary trials as following Bayesian logic.  See Ronald J. Allen, 
Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 INT’L. J. OF EVIDENCE & 
PROOF 254, 263-71 (1997).  Whatever one thinks about trials, it may be that the process by which 
Supreme Court Justices develop estimates of the preferences of their colleagues is less 
problematically described as Bayesian in nature because the “evidence” unfolds in a highly 
structured, incremental fashion. 
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estimate of the probability that Souter will vote to overrule Roe v. Wade.  Each 
of the other Justices starts with some information about Souter—that he was a 
Rhodes Scholar, he is a bachelor, he served as a criminal prosecutor in New 
Hampshire before becoming a judge, he was appointed to the Court by 
President Bush, and so forth—and on the basis of this fragmentary information 
develops a preliminary estimate of the probability that Souter will vote to 
overrule Roe.  The other Justices then observe Souter as he sets to work 
deciding cases with them.  If a case arises presenting a substantive due process 
question, for example, they will observe closely to see whether he is 
comfortable invoking that doctrine (on which Roe is based).  In effect, they 
develop a likelihood ratio for whether a Justice who is comfortable applying 
substantive due process will vote to overrule Roe.  Once they observe his 
behavior in the substantive due process case, they then revise their original 
estimate of whether he will vote to overrule Roe.  Then another case arises, 
presenting a question of how much weight to give to stare decisis in 
constitutional law.  The Justices each develop another likelihood ratio for 
whether someone who is willing to overrule such a constitutional precedent 
will vote to overrule Roe.  They then observe how Souter behaves in this case 
and revise once again their estimate of the probability he will vote to overrule 
Roe.  The process proceeds in the fashion, with each Justice presumably 
developing a more accurate estimate of probability of Souter’s decisive vote as 
the decisional process unfolds. 
The point of all this is that the accuracy of the estimates of positions on 
potential issues that each Justice has about the other eight Justices will differ 
significantly on a Court in flux than on a Court in stasis.  For a Court in flux, 
each new appointment means that the other Justices must start from scratch 
developing estimates of probabilities for the new Justice’s position on a host of 
issues. 
How long will it take before the other Justices develop a reasonably 
accurate picture of the new Justice’s preferences?  No doubt, the answer varies 
for each new Justice.  If Robert Bork had been confirmed as an Associate 
Justice in 1987, it would have taken relatively little time for the other Justices 
to ascertain his views on a number of controversial issues, compared to, say, 
the time it took to size up Justice Kennedy.287  There is reason to believe, 
however, that for the ordinary fledgling Justice the period of acclimation—and 
 
 287. Bork was rejected by the Senate, of course, precisely because his views on controversial 
topics were relatively predictable.  The lesson of the Bork episode is that, at least during a time of 
divided government, the President is better advised to nominate persons to the Court whose views 
are unknown or middle-of-the-road.  This means persons who will take a relatively long time to 
signal their views to other Justices.  Thus, to the extent that future Presidents continue to follow 
the strategy of appointing persons of unknown or moderate views to the Court, we can expect that 
the efficiency of the Court likely will be disrupted to a relatively large degree during periods of 
flux, as it apparently was during the first Rehnquist Court. 
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hence the period of uncertainty for the other Justices—is usually more than just 
a few years.  Justice White was fond of quoting Justice Douglas to the effect 
that “it takes five years to go around the track once.”288  The point of the 
remark is that it takes five years for a new Justice to become reasonably 
acquainted with the legal doctrine that pertains to the full menu of issues that 
come before the Court, to gain familiarity with the other Justices’ positions on 
these issues, and to stake out a personal position.  If this is correct, then a Court 
that sits together for five years and longer should begin to perform in ways 
qualitatively different from Courts that experience normal turnover. 
What this means, in practical terms, is that the Justices on a Court in flux 
will make more “mistakes” about the positions of other Justices than will the 
Justices on a Court in stasis.  The senior Justices on a Court in flux will be 
operating with inaccurate estimates of the positions of the junior Justices, and 
the junior Justices may be operating with somewhat inaccurate estimates of the 
positions of the senior Justices (assuming that one gains information from 
personal interaction that goes beyond what can be gained by studying prior 
opinions).  The mistakes created by this incomplete information will take many 
forms: Justices will vote to grant certiorari predicting a particular outcome on 
the merits when the outcome turns out differently; the Chief Justice or the 
Senior Associate Justice will assign opinions assuming a certain mode of 
analysis when the analysis turns out differently; and Justices will draft 
proposed opinions for the Court assuming at least four supporting votes when 
it turns out that there are less than four supporting votes.  In a word, a Court in 
flux will perform less “efficiently” in generating new law than will a Court in 
stasis. 
These conjectures provide a possible explanation for how it is that the 
second Rehnquist Court could decide a higher percentage of cases by 5-4 
margins, while simultaneously reducing the percentage of cases that result in 
plurality decisions.  Plurality opinions can be seen as potential 5-4 opinions 
that fail to make the grade because of incomplete information about the 
preferences of at least four other Justices.  Given the high premium placed on 
securing five votes for a single opinion in support of the judgment, we can 
assume that immediately after Conference on a case the Justices voting in the 
majority would nearly always like to see at least five votes for a single 
rationale.  If they fail to achieve this result, then the reason in most cases is 
because someone miscalculated the views of one or more of the others.  The 
first Rehnquist Court, as a Court in flux, was more likely to be plagued by 
these kinds of mistakes, and, hence, was behaving as expected in producing 
 
 288. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 76, at 349.  Justice White, according to his biographer, 
said that Justice Douglas attributed the remark to Chief Justice Hughes, id., suggesting that at 
least three Justices serving at different times and having different temperaments (White, Douglas, 
and Hughes) agreed with this assessment. 
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relatively fewer 5-4 decisions and relatively more plurality decisions.  As the 
membership of the second Rehnquist Court remained unchanged and the 
Justices came to have more and more information about each other’s 
preferences, the number of mistakes declined, resulting in a mounting number 
of 5-4 decisions and a declining incidence of plurality decisions. 
One would never expect the Court to eliminate all plurality opinions 
because novel issues have a way of popping up (such as the constitutionality of 
term limits or the line item veto), as to which there will inevitably be 
uncertainty about the positions of the Justices.  Also, some Justices’ views may 
change over time, creating another source of uncertainty.  Nevertheless, all else 
being equal, a Court in stasis should be more efficient at turning coalitions of 
five votes for a judgment into five votes for a single opinion of the Court, and 
this is what we in fact have seen in recent years on the Rehnquist Court. 
C. Bonds of Reciprocity 
It is likely that a Court in stasis differs from a Court in flux in ways more 
profound than simply having better information about the preferences of each 
of its members.  A Court that sits together for a long period of time is more 
likely to develop coalitions that feature stronger bonds of cooperation and 
reciprocity.  This, at least, would seem to be a plausible prediction suggested 
by the literature on game theory.  That literature indicates that participants in 
infinitely-repeated games are more likely to adopt cooperative strategies than 
are participants in single-play games or games with fixed termination points.289  
This literature further indicates that games of uncertain length will, in this 
respect, tend to resemble infinitely-repeated games.290  If it is plausible to think 
of the Supreme Court as being engaged in a strategic game of uncertain length 
played by nine Justices, then one would predict that over time the participants 
in this game would tend to evolve cooperative strategies or conventions.  More 
specifically, one would predict that a coalition of at least five Justices would 
form and would cooperate in reaching outcomes in contested cases, that the 
cooperation within this coalition would persist, and that the range of cases over 
which the coalition cooperates would very likely expand as the game 
progresses. 
If Supreme Court decision making can be modeled as a game, it is 
obviously an extraordinarily complex one.  If one were searching for a simple, 
two-party game on which to begin to think about coalition building on the 
Supreme Court, it might be “stag hunt.”  In this game, there are two hunters, 
who must decide whether to hunt for a stag or a hare.  Each hunter can catch a 
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hare on his own, but it takes two working together to kill a stag.  The payoff 
from sharing in half a stag, however, is worth more than the payoff from 
catching a hare.  In this game, “[t]he hunters’ interests do not conflict.  Each 
prefers to hunt stag, but only if the other does—and neither can be certain that 
the other will.  Stag hunting will take place only if each is assured that the 
other will hunt stag.”291  Analogously, one can say that groups of Justices who 
agree on the judgment in a case have a choice between writing separate 
opinions reflecting their own individual sincere views that justify the result, or 
joining a single opinion that reflects the shared views of at least five Justices.  
Writing separately (like killing a hare with certainty) has some payoff—one’s 
views may be applauded by law review writers and conceivably may lead to a 
change in law some day.  Joining an opinion for the Court, however, (like 
sharing in the kill of a stag) has a much larger payoff since this produces a 
binding precedent.  Obtaining the higher payoff, however, requires cooperation 
if it is to be achieved. 
The exact mechanism by which an extraordinarily complex, nine-player 
game of uncertain duration would generate an equilibrium of cooperative 
behavior is unclear, and such an outcome is by no means guaranteed.  The 
players may eventually learn of the benefits of cooperation by trial and error, 
or they may stumble upon strategies like tit-for-tat (in which players respond to 
cooperation by rewarding the cooperator and respond to defection by 
punishing the defector), which may conduce toward cooperation.292  The 
relevant point for present purposes is that whatever the precise mechanism by 
which cooperation comes about, if the game is sufficiently complex and has 
multiple players, it presumably takes time to achieve a cooperative 
equilibrium.  A Court in flux is less likely to achieve such an equilibrium 
because the introduction of new players disrupts the expectations and strategies 
of the other players, requiring in effect that the game start over.  A Court in 
stasis, in contrast, may be able to sustain enough rounds of play so that 
cooperation becomes the dominant and stable strategy within a coalition of at 
least five Justices. 
A number of distinguishing features of the second Rehnquist Court, such 
as its domination by a single five-Justice coalition, its greater willingness to 
declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, its superior capacity to achieve 
doctrinal innovations, and its greater ability to avoid plurality decisions, may 
plausibly be explained on the hypothesis that the Court, by the very reason of 
its stability over a long period of time, has reached a state in which the 
majority coalition enjoys stronger cohesion than one would expect to find 
within majority coalitions on Courts that experience normal turnover.  The 
growth in 5-4 decisions and the decline in plurality decisions, on this theory, is 
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not just a function of greater precision into predicting the positions of other 
Justices, as suggested earlier.  It is in addition or, alternatively, a function of 
the emergence of a convention shared by the members of the primary coalition. 
One especially intriguing implication is that the majority coalition on the 
Rehnquist Court may be expanding the sphere of cooperation beyond the 
original core of constitutional federalism to incorporate a wider variety of 
issues.  There have been a number of signs that this may be happening in 
recent Terms.  For example, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,293 the majority 
coalition engaged in an expansive interpretation of the First Amendment in 
order to preserve the Scout’s policy against openly gay scout leaders.  
Furthermore, in the most recent Term, the same five Justices held together to 
uphold school voucher programs against the allegation that this represents 
impermissible public funding of religion.294 
By far the most interesting illustration of how the original sphere of 
cooperation may be expanding over time is the controversial decision in Bush 
v. Gore,295 where the Court, defying expert predictions, intervened in the legal 
free-for-all over the unresolved presidential election in Florida and, in so 
doing, awarded the Presidency to George W. Bush.  As reconstructed by 
Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns,296 the Court was divided into four 
groups of Justices immediately after the second oral argument in the 
controversy.  On the right, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas wanted to reverse outright the Florida Supreme Court’s recount 
decision as a violation of Article II.  On the left, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg 
wanted to affirm outright.  In the middle, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy 
were dubious about the Article II argument, but felt that the Florida court’s 
recount raised equal protection concerns.  Also in the middle, Justices Souter 
and Breyer agreed that the Florida decision raised equal protection concerns, 
but they would have remanded to the Florida courts with directions to conduct 
a recount that was consistent with equal protection principles.  The question 
was whether Justices O’Connor and Kennedy would join forces with Justices 
Souter and Breyer in an equal protection ruling with a remand, or whether 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy would form a coalition with the three most 
conservative Justices on some basis. 
What happened, as we know, is that O’Connor and Kennedy fell in with 
the three committed conservatives.  The three conservatives evidently 
compromised on legal theory, joining a per curiam opinion that adopted the 
equal protection rationale and relegating their Article II theory to a concurring 
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opinion.  Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, for their part, agreed that the 
disposition in the per curiam opinion would be a reversal rather than a remand, 
thereby ending the recount and awarding the Presidency to George Bush. 
There are a variety of possible explanations for why Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy decided to join the three conservatives rather than try to form a 
coalition with Justices Souter and Breyer.297  Surely one possible explanation, 
however, is that by late 2000, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy had become 
thoroughly familiar and comfortable with forming coalitions with the 
conservatives.  Dense bonds of reciprocity had formed among the five most 
conservative Justices, and cooperation—which entailed both some compromise 
by the three conservatives on the legal theory and may have entailed some 
compromise by O’Connor and Kennedy on the remedy—was relatively easy to 
achieve.  Cooperating with Justices Souter and Breyer was less familiar and, 
hence, more difficult.  Thus, we see how something as simple as the judicial 
longevity of a Court may have fateful consequences. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
I have covered a lot of ground, which makes summing up more than 
ordinarily difficult.  Let me close by emphasizing three lessons this exercise 
may offer:  one for lawyers, one for political scientists, and one for both. 
The lesson for lawyers is that they should be more cautious about 
attributing the behavior of the Supreme Court to the influence of legal ideas.  
From a jurisprudential perspective, the Supreme Court over the last eight years 
looks like an institution on a mission.  Five Justices appear to have dedicated 
themselves to the revival of states’ rights as a bedrock principle of 
constitutionalism, and they have pursued this vision with single-minded 
determination.  It seems natural to attribute this behavior to the Justices’ 
commitment to ideals of federalism.  This type of explanation, however, leaves 
many scratching their heads, for it is doubtful that significant numbers of 
Americans, at this point in our history, care very much about constitutional 
federalism.  In this sense, the current Rehnquist Court reflects the rather odd 
spectacle of a Court on a mission, but without a popular mandate. 
The puzzle may be easier to explain if we start not with ideals, but with the 
assumption that the Justices rationally are seeking to maximize certain 
preferences.  At least, I have attempted to argue that the puzzle is explainable 
in these terms.  We are having a federalism revolution because, given the mix 
of motives and strategies among the nine Justices, it is basically the only 
revolution to be had. 
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This is not to suggest that lawyers should forgo normative analysis of legal 
questions.  That is their job.  I do think, however, that normativity could use a 
healthy dose of realism now and then.  Understanding the preferences and the 
strategies that lie behind the jurisprudence may provide insights into what 
kinds of arguments are likely to succeed and why, and it may give us some 
sense of how permanent the jurisprudential preferences of the current Justices 
are likely to be. 
The lesson for political scientists, I think, is that different theories of 
judicial behavior may apply in different degrees to different Justices.  There is 
a tendency in the political science literature to seek out some universal model 
for judicial behavior, to the effect that all judges behave reflexively, or all 
engage in strategic behavior of one stripe or another.  The truth may be far 
more complex.  Some Justices—Justice Blackmun perhaps—may be highly 
reflexive and give little thought to how other Justices and institutions will react 
to their decisions.  Other Justices—like Justice Brennan—may be intensely 
strategic.  Within the ranks of the strategic, some strategic Justices will be 
more sensitive internally to other Justices, while others may be more focused 
externally on public opinion. 
My study of the second Rehnquist Court is illustrative.  It may be that the 
five-member coalition for states’ rights is composed of two Justices who are 
relatively attitudinal or reflexive—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas; two Justices who are strategic in the sense that they are fleeing to 
federalism because of their fear of public opinion if they concentrate on other 
issues—Justices O’Connor and Kennedy; and one Justice who is a strategic 
federalist of the internal actor variety because he cannot get any action on any 
other front—Justice Scalia. 
Again, I am not suggesting that political scientists should forego 
reductionistic models in favor of historical or biographical narratives.  Building 
and testing reductionistic models is what political scientists do.  It is quite 
possible, however, that in studying an institution like the Supreme Court, 
where the behavior of each individual plays such a critical role in the 
performance of the institution, a more complex or multi-dimensional theory of 
judicial behavior will have more explanatory power than a single-dimensional 
theory. 
Finally, a lesson for both lawyers and political scientists is that far too little 
attention has been given in the past to the rate of turnover on collegial courts.  
One can distinguish three states of affairs: normal turnover, which historically 
has been about one new Justice every two years; above normal turnover; and 
subnormal turnover.  The first Rehnquist Court was a Court of above normal 
turnover; the second Rehnquist Court a Court of subnormal turnover.  I have 
argued in a preliminary fashion that a Court with above normal turnover is 
more likely to experience important changes in institutional inputs—the norms 
that govern institutional behavior.  A Court with subnormal turnover is more 
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likely to develop stable and powerful coalitions that produce important 
changes in institutional outputs—the legal doctrine produced by such Courts. 
Given the closely divided nature of the Rehnquist Court and the divided 
government and society in which it operates, I think it is very unlikely that the 
Court would have generated the important changes in the law of constitutional 
federalism we have seen in the last eight years without the added boost from 
subnormal turnover.  This is surely a phenomenon that deserves greater study 
in the future, by both lawyers and political scientists—hopefully in 
collaboration. 
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